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INTRODUCTION 
The refusal to treat those in need of emergency care remains a 
fact of life in this country.1 The following two reports are recent 
examples of a problem that will not go away: 
Terry Takewell was a young diabetic. Gasping for breath, he 
was taken by ambulance to the only local hospital in Fayette 
County, Tennessee. Takewell was not treated, but instead was 
carried out the door by a hospital administrator and set on the 
edge of the parking lot. He was picked up by neighbors and 
brought home. He died the next day. Terry had no insurance and 
owed the hospital a lot of money.2 
* Assistant Professor of Law & Director, Law & Health Care Program, University of 
Maryland. B.A., 1973, Princeton University; M.P .A., 1974, Woodrow Wilson School of Pub-
lic International Affairs, Princeton University; J.D., 1979, University of Virginia. My sincere 
thanks to Kathy L. Tubbs, my research assistant, for her dedication and hard work. 
1. This Article will primarily focus on the evolution of the legal duty to provide access 
into the emergency room and not on the inappropriate transfer of patients, commonly re-
ferred to as "dumping," from private to public hospitals. This distinction should be clear 
throughout the discussion of the common law. Refer to Sections I, II & ill infra. The evolu-
tion of legislative efforts, however, does not make such a clear distinction. Some recent state 
and federal legislation is comprehensive in scope and addresses both the duty to examine 
those who present themselves at emergency rooms, as well as the inappropriate transfer of 
these patients. Refer to Sections IV A & V infra. 
2. See Equal Access to Health Care: Patient Dumping: Hearing Before the Subcom· 
mittee on Human Resources & Intergovernmental Relations of the House Committee on 
Government Operations, lOOth Cong., 1st Sess. 14-20 (1987) [hereinafter Equal Access) 
(statement of Zettie Mae Hill). 
21 
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"Jane Doe" was six and a half months pregnant. She went to 
the local hospital in Fredicksburg, Virginia, bleeding heavily and 
in severe pain. The hospital nurse told her nothing could be done 
for her because she did not have a private doctor on staff. She 
was instructed, after a few hours elapsed, to go to University Hos-
pital - a two hour drive away. When she finally reached Univer-
sity Hospital, the doctor could not prevent the delivery of a pre-
mature baby. The baby died soon after birth.3 
These cases should never have happened. The hospitals were 
breaking the law. In 1986, Congress passed comprehensive legisla-
tion, commonly referred to as "COBRA,"" requiring hospitals re-
ceiving Medicare to examine all persons who present themselves 
for care in the emergency room. 11 Those patients in an emergency 
condition or in active labor must be provided treatment until they 
are stabilized. Tough enforcement provisions include termination 
or suspension of the Medicare provider's agreement and civil pen-
alties. Perhaps most significantly, the statute provides for a private 
right of action in which any individual harmed by a hospital's vio-
lation of the statute may obtain damages and equitable relief.0 
One can only appreciate the potential of such legislative action 
by understanding the legal responses, reactions, and frustrations of 
the past. Toward that goal, this Article will analyze the evolution 
of the legal duty to provide emergency care. 
The first section examines the major legal factors that contrib-
uted to the delay in creating a duty to treat. Nineteenth century 
tort theory established a distin"ction between misfeasance and non-
feasance. Thus, even in an emergency, there was no legal duty for 
any person, including a physician, to rescue or care for a person. 7 
3. Equal Access, supra note 2, at 43 (statement of Judith Waxman, Managing Attor-
ney, National Health Law Program). 
4. The Medicare amendments were incorporated as a part of a major spending bill, the 
Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA) of 1985. Refer to note 291 infra 
and accompanying text. 
5. Virtually all hospitals receive Medicare reimbursement. This legislation went into 
effect on August 1, 1986 and is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (Supp. IV 1986). 
6. Refer to Section V infra. 
7. Refer to Section lA infra. Physicians have no legal duty to treat anyone who desires 
medical treatment. Courts will not find a duty to treat on the part of a physician unless 
there has been an implied or expressed consensual agreement creating a physician-patient 
relationship. See, e.g., Childs v. Weis, 440 S.W.2d 104, 107 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1969, no 
writ). There may be, however, an ethical duty. The American Medical Association Princi-
ples of Medical Ethics provides: "[a] physician shall, in the provision of appropriate patient 
care, except in emergencies, be free to choose whom to serve ... " AMERICAN MED. Ass'N, 
PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS VI (1980), reprinted in BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES 
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Theoretically, the same rule applied to the hospital.8 Any attempt 
to challenge this legal theory as applied to the hospital was delayed 
for at least half a century by the shield of charitable immunity. To 
a large extent, charitable immunity, retarded the creation of a duty 
by protecting the hospitals from suit. A challenge to the no-duty 
rule posed a concurrent, undesired challenge to charitable immu-
nity. Furthermore, what little case law existed on the issue of a 
duty to treat was often misinterpreted. 
Section TI analyzes the search for a legal duty, which began in 
the early 1960s and failed to find a common-law stronghold. This 
OF BIOMEDICAL ETmcs 331-32 (1983) [hereinafter AMA]. 
8. Limitations inherent in the traditional hospital structure may have created a fur-
ther barrier to imposing clearly delineated duties to provide emergency care. At least three 
different hospital-physician relationship models exist in the emergency room. First, the 
emergency room physicians may be hospital employees. These physicians may work in the 
emergency room as part of a series of rotations through different departments or may work 
exclusively there, but in either case they are reimbursed through a salary which is paid by 
the hospital. Second, the physicians may be private physicians with hospital privileges who 
rotate through the emergency room as "on-call" physicians. Reimbursement in this situation 
generally comes directly from the patient. Finally, the physicians may be part of a group 
that has contracted with the hospital to perform emergency services. Reimbursement is gen-
erally from the hospital under the terms of the contract, but the physicians are considered 
independent contractors and not employees. This group does not norm!!lly have admitting 
privileges. 
Since Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 143 N.E.2d 3, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3 (1957), courts have 
found little difficulty in holding hospitals liable for the negligence of employee-physicians 
under the doctrine of respondeat superior. Generally, if the hospital exerts significant con-
trol over the physician, the hospital may be held vicariously liable for any negligence. 
The second and third types of relationships have posed greater problems. Because phy-
sicians in these situations are not considered employees, the doctrine of respondeat superior 
does not apply. In utilizing one of these arrangements, the hospital may avoid liability for 
the negligence of emergency room physicians. 
The courts, however, soon recognized the unfairness of allowing hospitals to "contract. 
away" their liability, and found ways to circumvent these situations using the doctrines of 
ostensible or apparent agency and corporate negligence. For a more det.niled discussion, see 
Comment, Medical Malpractice by Emergency Physicians and Potential Hospital Liabil-
ity, 75 KY. L.J. 633, 638-41 (1987). See also Mehlman v. Powell, 281 Md. 269, 378 A.2d 1121, 
1124 (1977) (apparent agency; absent notice to the contrary, a hospital represents that the 
staff of its emergency room are its employees); Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial 
Hosp., 33 lll. 2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253, 260·61 (1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 946 (1966) (cor-
porate negligence; hospital may be held liable for the negligence of a private physician in 
failing to review and monitor treatment and in failing to enforce its own medical staff 
bylaws). 
Another problem in this area involves the role of the "on-call" specialist who serves the 
emergency room. Necessity often dictates that in an emergency the emergency room physi-
cian call in a neurosurgeon, orthopedic surgeon, plastic surgeon, or in the case of active 
labor, an obstetrician. H these physicians refuse to treat, how can one hold the hospital 
liable? Unless these specialists are employees, which is most unusual, difficulty arises under 
current doctrines in holding the hospital liable under common law. Refer to Section V infra. 
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section includes an in-depth review of Wilmington General Hospi-
tal v. Manlove9 and its progeny-or lack thereof. Many commenta-
tors predicted over twenty-five years ago that after Manlove, the 
legal solution to the problem was found.10 Manlove established 
that when a hospital customarily renders emergency care service, 
and such undertaking is relied on by a person in need of emer-
gency care, the hospital has a duty to provide service to such per-
son. Contrary to popular belief, this reliance theory failed to pro-
vide the solution. The applications of, limitations of, and 
accommodations to the Manlove reliance theory will be examined. 
Section III analyzes the common-law search for an alternative 
to the Manlove theory. In 1975, in Guerrero v. Copper Queen Hos-
pital, 11 the Arizona Supreme Court created a duty based on a pub-
lic policy theory, requiring hospitals to provide emergency care.12 
The theory was quite innovative, but not widely adopted outside 
the state. 
Given that the common law, at best, has met with only limited 
success in assuring that emergency care is provided, Section IV 
briefly examines state legislation and past federal initiatives. With 
few exceptions, state laws and federal Hill-Burton Act13 obligations 
have had a limited impact on creating a statutory duty to provide 
emergency services. 
COBRA has perhaps the greatest potential for enforcing a le-
gal duty to provide nationwide emergency care. Yet certain ambi-
guities remain that may undercut its impact. Section V analyzes 
COBRA in detail and suggests ways to strengthen its effect. Partic-
ular attention is focused on the civil enforcement provision which 
provides, in part, for a private right of action for any individual 
harmed by a hospital's violation. This provision symbolizes the 
present endpoint to the evolution of the legal duty to provide 
emergency care. The evolution, however, will continue as the 
courts begin to interpret the new federal law. How the courts de-
fine the scope of the law and enforce the remedies available may 
ultimately determine whether the legal solution to the problem of 
access to emergency care has been found. 14 
9. 54 Del. 15, 174 A.2d 135 (1961). 
10. Refer to Section II infra. 
11. 112 Ariz. 104, 537 P.2d 1329 (1975)(en bane). 
12. 537 P.2d at 1331. 
13. 42 U.S.C. § 291c (1982). Refer to Section IVB infra. 
14. Although beyond the scope of this Article, it is obvious that any legal solution is 
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I. WHY No DUTY? 
A. The No-Duty Rule 
During the nineteenth century, neither the hospital nor the 
physician had a duty to help those in need of emergency care, even 
if the help was readily available. Although injury, mental anguish, 
pain and death might result, the traditional common law provided 
no remedy; at least, that was the perception. 
Tort theory embraced the distinction between nonfeasance 
and misfeasance.15 Essentially, the no-duty rule provides that no 
tort liability is imposed for nonfeasance, or failing to aid one in 
peril. Liability attaches only when one is guilty of misfeasance, or 
active misconduct that injures another. There exist several narrow 
classes of exceptions to this rule, but none is traditionally applied 
to hospitals.16 
The misfeasance-nonfeasance dichotomy theoretically results 
in no legal obligation to treat an injured, sick, or dying person ap-
pearing at an emergency room door.l'l If treatment is initiated, 
however, the hospital and its staff have a duty to act with reasona-
ble care under the circumstances and will be liable for harm caused 
by a breach of that duty.18 This breach is misfeasance. 
As a result, tort law was perceived to provide no legal incen-
tive to treat. To the contrary, the hospital was better off, from a 
liability standpoint, if it refused to treat at all. Of course, this per-
ception was merely theoretical because, for a number of reasons, 
hospitals generally did not get sued. 
compounded by the economic burden of providing this care to many without insur-
ance-and without a mechanism for reimbursing hospitals for these expenses. 
15. W. KEEToN, D. DoBBS, R. KEEToN & D. OWEN, PRoSSER AND KEEToN ON ToRTS § 56 
(5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEEToN]. 
16. The list of exceptions includes public carriers, innkeepers, and employers. Jd. 
17. Although not legally binding, the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals, 
a voluntary accreditation agency, has issued policy statements which provide that "[a)ny 
individual who comes to the hospital for emergency medical evaluation or initial treatment 
shall be properly assessed by qualified individuals, and appropriate services shall be ren-
dered within the defined capability of the hospital" JOINT CoMMISSION ON ACCREDITATION 01' 
HosPITALS, AccREDITATION MANuAL FOR HosPITALS 17 (1985). The agency further requires 
that "[i]ndividuals shall be accorded impartial access to treatment or accommodations that 
are available or medically indicated, regardless of race, creed, sex, national origin, or sources 
of payment for care." Id. at ix. 
18. REsTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF ToRTS § 323 (1965). 
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B. Charitable Immunity 
Historically, most hospitals were run as charitable or public 
institutions/9 and consequently were protected by charitable or 
sovereign immunity. Courts could not hold a hospital liable, with-
out dismantling established immunity protections. The duty to 
treat was rarely mentioned until the 1960s, when a number of fac-
tors, including the increasing abrogation of charitable immunity, 
cleared the way for suits against hospitals. Therefore, the imposi-
tion of any duty to treat in an emergency was at least delayed by 
the shield of immunity.20 
In 1876, one of the first cases to mention, in dictum, that there 
was no right to demand medical care, also recognized the charita-
ble immunity doctrine in the United States for the first time.21 In 
19. For an outstanding discussion of the evolution of hospitals and their changing role 
over the last two centuries in the United States see C. RosENBERG, TilE CARE OF STRANGERS: 
THE RISE OF AMERICA'S HOSPITAL SYSTEM (1987). 
20. The significance of sovereign or governmental immunity, as applied to public hos-
pitals, continues to be modified to a large degree by state tort claims acts. The rule of gov-
ernmental or sovereign immunity and its effect have been largely state-specific; however, tho 
general rule is that a government cannot be sued without its consent. The rule stems from 
the legal fiction, which grew up in Europe, that "the King can do no wrong," based, in part, 
on the idea that a claim cannot be enforced against the authority that created the claim. 
The impact of governmental immunity has been uneven, depending not only on the pres-
ence or absence of statutory authorization allowing suits against the government, but also on 
court distictions between governmental and proprietary activities. 
In the context of a hospital, courts impose liability for proprietary activities, but,gov-
ernmental functions remain protected by immunity, barring a statute to the contrary. Tho 
courts, however, have not been consistent in their distinctions between governmental and 
proprietary functions. For example, some courts have decided that if a hospital is operated 
by a governmental agency or unit, and takes at least some nonpaying patients, its activities 
are governmental. Others have held that charging patients is evidence of a proprietary func· 
tion and have disallowed immunity, at least as to a paying patient. See generally Annota-
tion, Immunity from Liability for Damages in Tort of State or Governmental Unit or 
Agency in Operating Hospital, 25 A.L.R.2d 203 (1952); 5 F. HARPER, F. JAMES & 0. GnAY, 
THE LAw OF ToRTS §§ 29.1-29.15A (2d ed. 1986) [hereinafter GRAY]. 
Furthermore, it is the public hospital that accepts the heavy, ever-increasing burden of 
treating emergencies for those without insurance. Not-for-profit hospitals, which tradition-
ally served almost two-thirds of the poor population, face changes in hospital funding that 
do not allow for cross-subsidizing the care of the uninsured. With recent competitive pres-
sures to reduce costs, many of these supposedly charitable institutions are shifting their 
indigent emergency patients to the already overcrowded and underfunded public hospitals. 
See Equal Access, supra note 2, at 105 (statement of Arnold Reiman, M.D., Editor, NEW 
ENGLAND JouRNAL OF MEDICINE). The focus of this Article will be on the nonprofit, private 
hospital and the significance of charitable immunity as borne out in the history of the cases. 
21. McDonald v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 120 Mass. 432 (1876). The court therein 
noted, in discussing the character of a charitable hospital, that the trustees were responsible 
for determining those "who are to be the immediate objects of the charity, and that no 
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McDonald v. Massachusetts General Hospital,22 the plaintiff 
brought an action against the hospital, alleging that his leg had 
been negligently set by an intern.23 The court, relying on an 1861 
English case, denied recovery based on a charitable immunity doc-
trine.24 The court reasoned, under the "trust fund theory," that 
the hospital, as a public charity, could not use donated funds to 
pay tort damages.25 What apparently was unknown to the A1cDon-
ald court, however, was that the English decision on which it relied 
had been overruled some ten years earlier.26 
Nevertheless, charitable immunity took a strong hold in 
America. By 1938, more than forty state courts had adopted the 
doctrine.27 Charitable immunity is an exception to the general rule 
that one is liable for one's own negligence, and several theories 
have been used to justify the doctrine.2s The four major theories 
are: (1) the "trust fund" theory; (2) the inapplicability of respon-
person has individually a right to demand admission to its benefits •••• " Id. at 435. 
I d. 
22. 120 Mass. 432 (1876). 
23. Id. 
24. I d. at 436 (citing Holliday v. St. Leonard's, 142 Eng. Rep. 769 (1861)). 
25. The court stated: 
[The hospital] has offered to [plaintiff] freely those ministrations which, as 
the dispenser of a public charity, it has been able to provide for his comfort • • • • 
It has no funds which can be charged with any judgment which he might recover, 
except those which are held subject to the trust of maintaining the hospital [l)f 
there has been no neglect on the part of those who administer the trust and con-
trol its management, and if due care has been used by them in the selection of 
their inferior agents, even if injury has occurred by the negligence of such agents, 
it cannot be made responsible. 
26. See Mersey Docks Trustees v. Gibbs, 11 Eng. Rep. 1500, 1501 (1866) (overruling 
Holliday in principle before it was later overruled by name in Foreman v. l\fuyor of Canter-
bury, L.R. 6 Q.B. 214, 218 (1871)). The court in President of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 
130 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 1942) noted: 
In this state of the English decisions, Massachusetts adopted the repudiated 
rule of Holliday v. St. Leonard in McDonald v. Massachusetts Generol Hospitul, 
•.. and Maryland followed [the overruled case of Feoffees of Heriot's Hospitul v. 
Ross, 8 Eng. Rep. 1508 (1846)] in Perry v. House of Refuge, 1885, 63 Md. 20, 52 
Am. Rep. 495. Apparently both courts acted in ignorance of the English reversaL 
In any event, they resurrected in America a rule already dead in England, and 
thereby gave Lord Cottenham's dictum [in Heriot's Hospital] a new lease on life 
in the New World. 
130 F.2d at 816. 
27. Note, The Quality of Mercy: "Charitable Torts" and Their Continuing Immunity, 
100 HARv. L. REv. 1382, 1384 (1987) [hereinafter Charitable Torts]. 
28. For an excellent detailed analysis of charitable immunity, see GRAY, supra note 20, 
§§ 29.16 - 29.17. See also note 30 infra (discussing the four major theories justifying the 
charitable immunity doctrine). 
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deat superior theory; (3) the implied waiver theory; and (4) the 
"public policy" theory.29 All four theories have been subject to sub-
stantial criticism. 30 
With time and various challenges to the theories of charitable 
immunity, the doctrine fell into disfavor. As early as 1915, and 
peaking in the 1950s and 1960s, states abrogated the doctrine 
through either judicial decision or legislative action. 31 
29. GRAY, supra note 20, at § 29.6. 
30. The McDonald case is an example of the trust fund theory, explained by Lord 
Cottenham in Feoffees of Heriot's Hospital v. Ross, 8 Eng. Rep. 1508 (1846): "To give dam· 
ages out of a trust fund would not be to apply it to those objects whom the author of the 
fund had in view, but would be to divert it to a completely different purpose." I d. at 1510. 
The trust fund theory has been rejected in part due to the argument that donors do not 
intend to and cannot lawfully exempt the benefactors of their donations from their rights 
under the law. GRAY, supra note 20, § 29.16, at 755. Essentially, the trust fund theory is 
illogical. It assumes what it is trying to prove, that payment of tort damages is not a charita-
ble purpose. ld. 
The second theory rests on the argument that since a charity does not financially bene· 
fit from the labor of its employees, the principle of respondeat superior is inapplicable to a 
charitable institution. The theory has been soundly criticized as inconsistent with the basis 
for respondeat superior, the employer's right to control his or her employee through diroc· 
tion and selection. Widell v. Holy Trinity Catholic Church, 19 Wis. 2d 648, 121 N.W.2d 249, 
253 (1963). For further discussion, see GRAY, supra note 20, § 29.16, at 759. 
The third theory is the implied waiver theory. This is based on the legal fiction that one 
who accepts the benefits of a charity impliedly waives any right to recover for injury due to 
negligence. The theory is widely criticized and represents perhaps the most unsupportable 
reason for the application of charitable immunity. See generally Note, The Diminishing 
Doctrine of Charitable Immunity: An Analysis, 19 DRAKE L. REV. 187, 193 (1969). To re-
quire the patient in need of charitable assistance to give up any right to damages if he or 
she is injured seems unjust. While some courts hold that the implied waiver does not apply 
to paying patients, this does not relieve the heavy burden on the poor individual who must 
seek treatment at a charitable hospital. GRAY, supra note 20, § 29.16, at 760-62. 
A broad public policy theory has also been used to justify charitable immunity. The 
rationale is based on the notion that since charities are "good," the law should protect and 
foster their existence. It is believed that immunity encourages donations while liability 
would make persons less willing to donate to charities, although the evidence is to the con· 
trary. Id. 
Logically, the public policy theory must fail. First, if the threat of tort liability acts to 
deter bad medical practice, then immunity tends to foster negligence, and promoting chari· 
table negligence is hardly consistent with the public good. Second, if donors are benevolent 
persons who wish to help others, leaving victims of negligence with no remedy defeats do-
nors' intentions. ld. 
Immunity as a means of sustaining a charity's existence has also been challenged, espe· 
cially given the availability of insurance to guard against large tort judgments. Although 
insurance availability has become problematic, hospitals have pooled resources and devol· 
oped self-insurance funds to address current needs. ld. 
31. For the view that charitable immunity has not been abolished to the extent goner· 
ally believed, see Charitable Torts, supra note 27, at 197. See also 2 D. LOUISELL & H. 
WILLIAMS, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE § 17.22 (1988) for a complete listing of the statUS of chari· 
table immunity in each state. 
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Not surprisingly, as use of the doctrine diminished, cases 
against hospitals, including those asserting a right to treatment, 
began to appear in the courts. For example, the first case to deal 
with a hospital's duty relating to emergency care was a 1934 Ala-
bama case, Birmingham Baptist Hospital v. Crews.32 Alabama was 
one of the first states to abolish the charitable immunity doc-
trine-as applied to employees and paying beneficiaries in 1915,33 
and then as to invitees in 1933. 3' The next case to deal directly 
with this issue was a 1960 New York case, O'Neill v. Montefiore 
Hospital.35 The O'Neill court decided this case only three years 
after New York abrogated its charitable immunity doctrine.313 The 
great majority of cases dealing with the duty of a hospital to treat 
appeared in the 1960s as the charitable immunity doctrine fell into 
increasing disfavor. 37 
C. The Misinterpretation of the Case Law 
Even without immunity, the few courts that addressed the 
duty to treat misinterpreted the case law, further confusing the is-
sue and retarding new development in the area. When describing 
the character of a charitable trust, the McDonald court stated, in 
1876, that "no person has individually a right to demand admis-
32. 229 Ala. 398, 157 So. 224 (1934). Refer to notes 43-53 infra and accompanying text. 
33. Tucker v. Mobile Infirmary Ass'n, 191 Ala. 572, 68 So. 4, 9 (1915). 
34. Alabama Baptist Hosp. Bd. v. Carter, 226 Ala. 109, 145 So. 443, 445 (1932), afrd, 
227 Ala. 560, 151 So. 62 (1933). Liability as to nonpaying beneficiaries is still an open ques-
tion in Alabama. 
35. 11 A.D.2d 132, 202 N.Y.S.2d 436 (N.Y. App. Div. 1960). Refer to notes 54-60 infra 
and accompanying text. 
36. Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 667, 143 N.E.2d 3, 9, 163 N.Y.S. 2d 3, 12 (1957). 
37. See, e.g., Wilmington Gen. Hosp. v. Manlove, 54 Del. 15, 174 A.2d 135, 140 (1961) 
(private hospital's duty to treat in an unmistakable emergency); Durney v. St. Francis 
Hosp., Inc., 46 Del. 350, 83 A.2d 753, 758 (1951) (Delaware abolished charitable immunity); 
Wilson v. Lee Memorial Hosp., 65 So. 2d 40, 41 (Fla. 1953) (abolishing the immunity doc-
trine in Florida); Ruvio v. North Broward Hosp. Dist., 186 So. 2d 45, 46 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1966), cert. denied, 195 So. 2d 567 (Fla. 1966) (no liability in the absence of the hospital's 
negligence); LeJuene Road Hosp., Inc. v. Watson, 171 So. 2d 202, 203 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1965) (private hospital has no duty to admit any patient); New Biloxi Hasp., Inc. v. Frazier, 
245 Miss. 185, 146 So. 2d 882, 887 (1962) (hospital providing emergency treatment must 
provide suitable medical attention); :Mississippi Baptist Hosp. v. Holmes, 214 Miss.. 906, 55 
So. 2d 142, 156 (1951), aff'd, 214 Miss. 906, 56 So. 2d 709 (1952) (Mississippi abolished the 
immunity doctrine); Stanturf v. Sipes, 447 S.W.2d 558, 562 (Mo. 1969) (duty to treat when 
reducing medical services); Abernathy v. Sisters of St. Mary's, 446 S.W.2d 599, 60S (Mo. 
1969) (en bane) (:Missouri abolished charitable immunity). Refer to Section ll infra. 
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sion to [a charity's] benefits."38 This statement had no relationship 
to the controversy, nor was it supported by any case law. It had its 
impact nonetheless. In 1924, in VanCampen v. Olean General 
Hospital,39 a New York court noted that "[t]he law does not re-
quire a [hospital] to furnish its services and accommodations to 
everyone who applies, whether patient or physician."40 Similarly, 
in Levin v. Sinai Hospital,"1 the Maryland Court of Appeals stated 
that "[a] private hospital is not under a common-law duty to serve 
every one who applies for treatment or permission to serve."42 Mc-
Donald, Van Campen, and Levin dealt only with a hospital's right 
to grant or revoke staff privileges, not the right to emergency care. 
Yet, to this day, courts continue to cite these cases for the no duty 
to treat rule. 
Birmingham Baptist Hospital v. Crews43, decided fifty-eight 
years after McDonald, did involve treatment in an emergency 
room. The plaintiff brought his daughter to the hospital for treat-
ment of diphtheria."" The staff administered antitoxin and oxygen, 
but refused to admit her as a regular patient, fearing contagion.4G 
She died soon after leaving the hospital.46 
The child's father brought a wrongful death action, charging 
that the hospital had "received her for hospital service and then 
wrongfully refused to render that service, and required her to be 
carried away, at a time when she needed it, resulting in an acceler-
ation of her death."47 The court rejected the plaintiff's argument, 
carefully distinguishing between "treatment in an emergency," and 
"full hospital service."48 The court found that the hospital admin-
istered proper emergency treatment, and acted appropriately in 
following its established policy of refusing admission to persons 
with contagious diseases. 49 
38. 120 Mass. at 435. Refer to note 21 supra. 
39. 210 A.D. 204, 205 N.Y.S. 554 (1924) (physician challenge to arbitrary cancellation 
of hospital privileges). 
40. Id. at 209, 205 N.Y.S. at 558 (dictum). 
41. 186 Md. 174, 46 A.2d 298 (1946) (physician challenge of denial of hospital 
privileges). 
42. Id. at 180, 46 A.2d at 301. 
43. 229 Ala. 398, 157 So. 224 (1934). 
44. Id. at 399, 157 So. at 225. 
45. Id. at 400, 157 So. at 225. 
46. Id., 157 So. at 225. 
47. Id. at 399, 157 So. at 225. 
48. Id. , 157 So. at 225-26. 
49. Id. at 400, 157 So. at 225-26. 
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Apparently, the court recognized a two-stage process: (1) 
emergency treatment; and (2) in-patient care. The distinction sup-
ported the holding that there was no abandonment of the patient 
upon completion of the care at the first stage when care at the 
second stage had not begun. The reasons for the distinctions are 
not clearly stated, although the opinion alludes to a fear that hos-
pitals would be put in a no-win situation if held liable for aban-
donment even after taking every possible step to help a victim.110 
Despite the Crews court's distinction between emergency and 
in-patient care, the case is often cited erroneously as support for 
the proposition that a hospital may refuse to treat persons, even in 
an emergency situation.111 The Crews court did state that a private 
hospital was under "no duty to accept any patient not desired by 
it,"52 but whether that statement applied to emergency or in-pa-
tient care or both is uncertain. Clearly, the Crews holding does not 
reach the question of the duty to provide emergency medical care. 
The court explicitly states that proper emergency care was given.113 
By the time of the Crews decision, there was no case holding 
that denied the existence of a duty of emergency care. The Afc-
Donald court's statement was dictum, discussing only the charac-
ter of a charitable trust. The VanCampen and Levin cases both 
involved physician staff privileges and did not discuss a duty to 
give medical treatment. Finally, although the Crews case dealt 
with treatment, the duty to provide emergency medical treatment 
50. Id., 157 So. at 225-26. The court explained: 
Our judgment is that the only fair inference from these facts is that the treat-
ment given was but an emergency treatment as the only hope in a desperate situa-
tion, administered as soon as the trouble was diagnosed, and that, since it is ad-
mitted to have been the appropriate thing to do in such emergency, it d~ not 
justify an inference that defendant undertook to do more than was immediately 
apparent as the only hope. We think that such treatment d~ not justify an infer-
ence that defendant undertook to render ordinary hospital service in violation or 
its rules, and so as to endanger the lire or health of other patients. • • • The will-
ingness of defendant to provide such treatment should not be used to its 
prejudice .•.. 
Id., 157 So. at 225-26. 
51. See, e.g., Thompson v. Sun City Community Hosp., Inc., 141 Ariz. 597, 602 n.3, 
688 P.2d 605, 610 n.3 {1984); Wilmington Gen. Hosp. v. Manlove, 54 DeL 15, 21, 174 A.2d 
135, 138 (1961); LeJuene Road Hosp. v. Watson, 171 So. 2d 202, 203 {Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1965); Fjerstad v. Knutson, 271 N.W.2d 8, 11 {S.D. 1978); Mercy Medical Center or Osh-
kosh, Inc. v. Winnebago County, 58 Wis. 2d 260, 266, 206 N.W.2d 198, 200 {1973). 
52. 229 Ala. at 399, 157 So. at 225. 
53. Id. at 400, 157 So. at 225. The court refers to the action of the hospital as "an 
emergency treatment" and "the appropriate thing to do in such an emergency." /d., 157 So. 
at 225. 
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was not at issue. 
The 1960s, however, saw various courts begin to struggle with 
the "assumed" general rule that there was no duty on the part of a 
hospital to treat, even in an emergency. O'Neill v. Montefiore Hos-
pital64 was the first case to approach the issue directly. The court 
framed the issue as whether "there was a duty owing respectively 
by the hospital and the doctor to examine and treat plaintiff's de-
ceased husband."1515 The nurse in the emergency ward had made a 
phone call for the decedent, to his doctor.156 The court queried 
"whether the conduct of the nurse in relation to the deceased was 
in the nature of a personal favor to him or whether her conduct 
was that of an attache of the hospital trying to discharge her 
duty."157 In other words, the court wanted a determination as to 
whether by her actions she "undertook to provide medical atten-
tion for the deceased."158 
By focusing on this aspect of the case, the court sidestepped 
the issue of a hospital's duty to treat and focused on a more tradi-
tional abandonment issue. Apparently, the opinion assumes that 
absent a hospital-patient relationship, analogous to the physician-
patient relationship, 159 there is no duty to treat. If the nurse in 
some way began medical treatment by making the phone call, then 
the hospital could be held liable. If the call was only a "favor," the 
court intimates that there would be no basis for liability.00 
Although the O'Neill court asked, but did not directly answer, 
the question of whether a hospital must treat in an emergency, its 
questionable justification for liability-that through its agent, the 
hospital began some form of medical treatment by phoning a doc-
tor-suggests an attempt at a solution and a dissatisfaction with 
the perceived state of the common law.61 This frustration set the 
54. 11 A.D.2d 132, 202 N.Y.S.2d 436 (N.Y. App. Div. 1960). 
55. Id. at 133, 202 N.Y.S.2d at 438. 
56. Id. at 134, 202 N.Y.S.2d at 438. 
57. Id. at 135, 202 N.Y.S.2d at 440. 
58. Id., 202 N.Y.S.2d at 440. 
59. Refer to note 8 supra. 
60. O'Neill, 11 A.D.2d at 135, 202 N.Y.S.2d at 440. 
61. Courts have found that a hospital, by initiating some treatment, created a suffi-
cient hospital-patient relationship (i.e., an "implied admission") and, therefore, had a duty 
to provide care. See Methodist Hosp. v. Ball, 50 Tenn. App. 460, 362 S.W.2d 475 (1961); 
Bourgeois v. Dade County, 99 So. 2d 575 (Fla. 1957); Citizens Hosp. Ass'n. v. Schoulin, 262 
So. 2d 303 (Ala. Ct. App. 1972). Ball, Bourgeois, and Schoulin apparently were motivated 
by the same concerns expressed in O'Neill. See also Fine, Opening the Closed Doors: The 
Duty of Hospitals to Treat Emergency Patients, 24 WASH. U.J. URD. & CoNTEMP. L. 123, 
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stage for the first case that imposed a duty to treat in an 
emergency. 
II. THE MANLoVE CASE: THE SEARCH FoR A DuTY 
The facts of Wilmington General Hospital v. Manlove02 were 
compelling. Parents brought their infant son, suffering from diar-
rhea and a high fever, to the local hospital.63 The nurse on duty 
refused to treat the child because hospital policy dictated that in 
the absence of a "frank indication of emergency,"64 patients al-
ready attended by a private doctor must be admitted by that doc-
tor before receiving treatment.611 The child died of bronchial pneu-
monia a few hours later. 66 The parents brought a wrongful death 
action against the hospital, presenting the Delaware court with a 
new legal challenge to the no-duty rule.67 
A. The Superior Court Decision: The Quasi-Public Theory 
The hospital filed a motion for summary judgment08 in the Su-
perior Court, relying on the no-duty rule and characterizing the 
nurse's action as nonfeasance.69 The hospital argued that there was 
no duty to treat, diagnose, or admit the Manlove baby.70 To avoid 
the established rule, the plaintiff contended that the nurse's inac-
tion constituted an incorrect diagnosis that no emergency existed 
and was therefore misfeasance.71 
Acknowledging the importance in tort law of the misfeasance-
nonfeasance doctrine, the Superior Court rejected the plaintiff's 
reasoning, stating that it "beg[ged] the issue.JJ72 The court also 
noted the analogy between this case and the common-law rule that 
129-31 (1983) (discussion of cases circumventing application of the no-duty rule); Powers, 
Hospital Emergency Service and the Open Door, 66 MICH. L. REv. 1455, 1464-75 (1968) 
(factual analysis of several cases showing judicial dissatisfaction with the no-duty rule). 
62. 54 DeL 15, 174 A.2d 135 (1961). 
63. Id. at 16-17, 174 A.2d at 136. 
64. Id. at 18, 174 A.2d at 137 (emphasis by the court). 
65. ld. at 17, 174 A.2d at 136. 
66. Id., 174 A.2d at 136. 
67. Id., 174 A.2d at 136. 
68. Manlove v. Wilmington Gen. Hosp., 53 DeL 338, 339, 169 A.2d 18, 19 (DeL Super. 
Ct.), rev'd, 54 DeL 15, 174 A.2d 135 (1961). 
69. 53 DeL at 342, 169 A.2d at 20. 
70. Id., 169 A.2d at 20. 
71. Id., 169 A.2d at 20. 
72. Id., 169 A.2d at 20. 
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a private physician is "under no legal duty to accept any person for 
treatment, no matter how extreme the emergency .... "73 Not sat-
isfied with the result, the court proposed an innovative basis for 
liability, by reasoning that the hospital should be classified as a 
"quasi-public" institution because it received tax exemptions, pub-
lic subsidies, and a corporate charter under Delaware law.7" These 
public benefits were enough to alter the character of a "private" 
hospital, such that it "should be required at all times to render 
reasonably needed aid in those instances where an emergency in-
volving death or serious bodily impairment might reasonably be 
said to exist."711 Therefore, the Superior Court held that the de-
fendant's nonfeasance theory and analogy to the no-duty rule gov-
erning private physicians in an emergency situation failed because 
acceptance of public funds and tax benefits "changed [the hospi-
tal's] characterization to that of a quasi public [sic] institution, 
thereby forfeiting to a measured extent the degree of privacy that 
it otherwise possessed. "76 
The Superior Court struggled to find a theoretical basis for 
recognizing a duty. By characterizing the hospital as a quasi-public 
entity, it obligated the private institution to act in the public inter-
est by providing emergency services. The duty accrued in return 
for receipt of public benefits such as tax exemptions and govern-
ment funding. Whatever the rationale, this theory was short-
lived-at least in Delaware.77 
B. The Supreme Court Decision: The Reliance Theory 
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Delaware affirmed the order 
of the Superior Court, but rejected its reasoning. 78 In so doing, it 
cited Crews, McDonald, and VanCampen-perhaps incorrectly-
as supporting the general proposition that "[a] private hospital 
owes the public no duty to accept any patient not desired by 
73. Id. at 345, 169 A.2d at 21. 
74. Id. at 346, 169 A.2d at 22. 
75. Id. at 345, 169 A.2d at 22. 
76. Id., 169 A.2d at 22. 
77. A few courts have used the quasi-public hospital theory to prevent secular hospi-
tals from refusing to provide treatment to achieve "moral" objectives. See, e.g., Doe v. 
Bridgeton Hosp. Ass'n, 71 N.J. 478, 366 A.2d 641, 647 (1976) (nonsectarian, nonprofit hospi-
tal may not refuse abortion services). 
78. Wilmington Gen. Hosp. v. Manlove, 54 Del. 15, 27, 174 A.2d 135, 141 (1961). 
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it .... "79 The court then explicitly stated that receipt of public 
funds and exemption from taxation do not convert a privat~ hospi-
tal into a public or quasi-public hospital.80 The Delaware Supreme 
Court also noted that since a hospital is "privately owned and op-
erated, it would follow logically that its trustees or governing board 
alone have the right to determine who shall be admitted to it as 
patients. No other rule would be sensible or workable."81 
The court distinguished, however, between a duty to accept an 
in-patient and a duty to "give treatment in an emergency case, i.e., 
one obviously demanding immediate attention. "82 The former duty 
is nonexistent as to a private hospital, but the latter duty arises, 
under a court-fashioned reliance theory, "if the patient has relied 
upon a well-established custom of the hospital to render aid in 
such a case."83 
The Delaware court found this situation analogous84 to the re-
liance theory set forth in section 323 of the Restatement (Second) 
of Torts, which states: 
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to 
render services to another which he should recognize as necessary 
for the protection of the other's person or things, is subject to 
liability to the other for physical harm resulting from his failure 
to exercise reasonable care to perform his undertaking, if 
(a) his failure to exercise such care increases the risk of harm, 
or 
(b) the harm is suffered because of the other's reliance upon 
the undertaking. 815 
There are, however, problems with the analogy. The Restatement 
rule generally means that liability attaches when one has actually 
begun to perform some sort of service. In fact, the Restatement 
contains a caveat explicitly expressing "no opinion" as to whether 
the making of a "gratuitous promise, without in any way ent~ring 
upon performance, is a sufficient undertaking to result in liability 
79. 54 Del. at 21, 174 A.2d at 138 (quoting 41 C.J.S. Hospitals § 8, at 345 (1944)). 
(citing also Crews and McDonald); id. at 22, 174 A.2d at 139 (citing Van Campen). Refer to 
notes 21-53 and accompanying text. 
80. Id. at 19, 174 A.2d at 137. 
81. Id. at 21, 174 A.2d at 138. 
82. Id. at 22, 174 A.2d at 139. 
83. 174 A.2d at 140 (quoted language omitted from the Delaware Reports opinion). 
84. 54 Del. at 23, 174 A.2d at 139. 
85. REsTATEMENT (SEcoND) oF ToRTS § 323 (1965). 
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under the rule .... "86 
One might question whether "reliance on a well-established 
custom" even rises to the level of a "gratuitous promise." The 
court, however, found that when a person in need of emergency 
care relies on an established custom to render it, "such a refusal 
might well result in worsening the condition of the injured person, 
because of the time lost in a useless attempt to obtain medical 
aid," seeming to parallel the increased-risk-of-harm language in 
section 323 (a).87 Nevertheless, the recurrent issue is the extent to 
which performance of the undertaking has started. Therefore, the 
court's analogy between the Manlove reliance theory and the Re-
statement theory is not clear. The court states that the analogy 
exists, but does not explain how.88 
The decision by the Supreme Court of Delaware was a turning 
point in the search for a common-law duty to treat, representing 
the first time that a court went beyond the constraints of both the 
traditional tort misfeasance-nonfeasance theory and the require-
ment of a hospital-patient relationship to find a new basis of 
liability. 
An analysis of the Manlove test must focus on its four ele-
ments: (1) the hospital must maintain an emergency room;89 (2) an 
"unmistakable emergency" must exist;90 (3) a well-established cus-
tom to render care in such circumstances must be found;91 and ( 4) 
the injured party must have relied on that custom. 92 
The first element states the obvious and is a factual matter. As 
to the second, however, the court was less than clear. What consti-
tutes an "unmistakable emergency"? As a secondary issue, who de-
cides if there is an emergency and to what standard of care will he 
be held? 
The court defined "emergency" as a condition "obviously de-
manding immediate attention."93 The next question is: Obvious to 
whom? The court answered that "someone on behalf of the hospi-
tal must make a prima facie decision whether it exists," and the 
court recognized that since some hospitals cannot reasonably be 
86. Id. 
87. 54 Del. at 23, 174 A.2d at 139. 
88. Id., 174 A.2d at 139. 
89. Id., 174 A.2d at 139. 
90. Id. at 22, 174 A.2d at 139. 
91. Id. at 23, 174 A.2d at 140. 
92. Id., 174 A.2d at 140. 
93. Id. at 22, 174 A.2d at 139. 
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expected to have a doctor on duty at all times, a nurse may of 
necessity make the decision.9' The court found that there must be 
"evidence that an experienced nurse should have known that such 
symptoms constituted unmistakable evidence of an emergency.'1911 
Does the Manlove test require an actual examination of the 
prospective patient by the person making the prima facie decision 
as to whether there is an emergency?96 Again, the answer is unclear 
from the language of the opinion. The court does say that, espe-
cially in the case of a disease (as opposed to physical injury), 
"some degree of experience and knowledge is required" to make 
such a judgment.97 One might also assume that without an actual 
examination, the emergency nature of a disease is indiscernable. 
Yet the court later stated that the question of the nurse's liability 
rested on whether she was "derelict in her duty ... in not recog-
nizing an emergency from the symptoms related to her."98 Fur-
thermore, the court relieved the decisionmaker of liability unless 
her decision was "clearly unreasonable."99 
One is drawn to the conclusion that although .Manlove at-
tempted to impose some sort of liability on the hospital, the result-
ing burden on the plaintiff is unreasonably heavy. The plaintiff 
must prove that an "unmistakable emergency exist.ed," while the 
hospital need only exercise reasonable medical judgment, perhaps 
without even the requirement of an examination. 
The third and fourth elements of the Manlove test are even 
more problematic. What constitutes a "well-established" custom? 
How does the plaintiff prove reliance? Manlove indicated that sim-
ply having an emergency room may be enough to show a "well-
established" custom, 100 noting that while a private hospital is 
under no legal obligation to maintain an emergency room, it has 
become "a well-established adjunct to the main business of a hos-
pital.m01 Additionally, the court never really defined reliance. Even 
though it asked: "What is standard hospital practice when an ap-
plicant for aid seeks medical aid for sickness at the emergency 
94. Id. at 24, 174 A.2d at 139. 
95. ld. at 25, 174 A.2d at 140. 
96. COBRA imposes a duty to perform a screening examination on all who present 
themselves to the emergency room. Refer to note 296 infra and accompanying text. 
97. 54 Del. at 26, 174 A.2d at 140. 
98. Id., 174 A.2d at 141 (emphasis added). 
99. Id. at 24, 174 A.2d at 140. 
100. Id. at 23, 174 A.2d at 139. 
101. Id., 174 A.2d at 139. 
HeinOnline -- 26 Hous. L. Rev. 38 1989
38 HOUSTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26:21 
ward? ,"102 the court was referring only to the question of who gen-
erally determines whether an emergency exists-a nurse or a 
doctor.103 
It is questionable whether the Manlove test requires that the 
injured person actually prove reliance. The court remanded the 
case for a determination as to whether there was an unmistakable 
emergency/04 but did not ask for, nor define, appropriate evidence 
of reliance or a well-established custom. Perhaps simply going to 
the emergency room is enough. The language of the opinion, how-
ever, imposes liability in the case of an unmistakable emergency "if 
the patient has relied upon a well-established custom of the hospi-
tal to render aid in such a case,moe> suggesting that something more 
must be proved. Another problem is whether reliance is presumed 
or ignored as an element when the injured person is brought to the 
hospital by ambulance, and perhaps unconscious, as is often the 
case in an emergency. 
C. The Manlove Progeny: Applications, Limitations & 
Accommodations 
Despite these problems, Manlove received acclaim as the an-
swer to the need for a common-law duty to treat. One commenta-
tor described it as "a recognition of new public attitudes toward 
the issues of health, hospitals, and emergency rooms," and possibly 
"the first step toward the establishment of health care as a right, 
legally guaranteed to all Americans. "106 Although this hope seems 
overly optimistic, the truth is that the Manlove reliance theory has 
done very little to change the case law. Over its twenty-six year 
history, Manlove is cited in less than twenty-five court decisions, 
successfully in only a few cases.107 Usually, Manlove is cited for its 
traditional negligence analysis;108 as an example of reliance on a 
gratuitous promise;109 or for the proposition that there is no legal 
102. Id. at 26, 174 A.2d at 141. 
103. !d., 174 A.2d at 141. 
104. !d. at 26-27, 174 A.2d at 141. 
105. 174 A.2d at 140 (quoted language omitted from the Delaware Reports opinion). 
106. Gold, Emergency Room Medical Treatment: Right or Privilege?, 36 ALB. L. REV. 
526, 535 (1972). 
107. Refer to notes 112-19 infra and accompanying text. 
108. See, e.g., Larrimore v. Homeopathic Hosp. Ass'n, 54 Del. 235, 245, 176 A.2d 362, 
367 (1961) (evidence of skill and care must be proved by expert testimony). 
109. See Brown v. MacPherson's, Inc., 85 Wash. 2d 17, 24, 530 P.2d 277, 281 (1975) 
(involving an action for failure to warn of a hazardous condition). 
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duty for a hospital to maintain an emergency room.110 The 
Manlove test has also appeared in cases in which the issue was not 
a duty to render emergency care; these cases involved negligent 
emergency care or improper transfer following admittance as a 
;patient.111 
1. Successful Application. The Manlove test has been suc-
cessfully applied in at least one case: Stanturf v. Sipes.112 In Stan-
turf v. Sipes, the plaintiff sought treatment for frostbite of his feet, 
but the hospital refused treatment because he was unable to pay a 
twenty-five dollar fee. After almost a week, another hospital admit-
ted the plaintiff, but both feet required amputation.113 In reversing 
a summary judgment for defendants, the court applied the 
Manlove test to show that issues of fact existed.114 The court found 
that the hospital maintained an emergency room and that the 
pleadings, depositions, and admissions supported a finding that 
plaintiff's condition was an emergency situation.1111 
Citing section 323 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the 
court also noted that the defendant was the only hospital in the 
immediate area, and that it was "the long established rule of the 
hospital to accept all persons for treatment upon the payment of a 
$25 admittance fee."116 These facts, the court stated, gave the 
plaintiff reason to rely on the practice of rendering emergency 
care.117 In searching for causation, the court found that the decline 
in Mr. Stanturf's condition could have been caused by the delay in 
obtaining treatment.118 
Thus, the facts in Stanturf seem to fit the elements of the 
Manlove test rather well. Of course, the admission by the hospital 
that its policy was to admit anyone offering a twenty-five dollar fee 
played a large part in the decision.119 In the absence of such con-
crete evidence, reliance may well be more difficult to prove. 
Other courts do appear to accept the reliance test without spe-
110. Schagrin v. Wilmington Medical Center, 304 A.2d 61, 64 (Del Super. Ct. 1973). 
111. Refer to notes 178-96 infra and accompanying text. 
112. 447 S.W.2d 558 (Mo. 1969). 
113. 447 S.W.2d at 560. 
114. Id. at 562-63. 
115. Id. at 562. 
116. Id. 
117. Id. 
118. Id. 
119. Id. 
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cifically citing the Manlove opinion.12° For example, in Valdez v. 
Lyman-Roberts Hospital,121 the decedent was a pregnant woman, 
apparently seriously ill, who was turned away from two area hospi-
tals.122 She died upon her return home.123 
Proximate cause was the only issue on appeal, since the de-
fendant hospitals admitted their breach of duty.124 The court rec-
ognized the defendants' negligence, noting the principles embodied 
in the Manlove test: 
While a private hospital may conduct its business largely as it 
sees fit, liability on the part of the hospital may be predicated on 
the refusal of service to a patient in the case of an unmistakable 
emergency if the patient has relied upon the custom of the hospi-
tal to render aid in such a case.125 
The court found that there was evidence in the record of the hos-
pitals' "reputation" of treating emergencies.128 
2. Limitations. The reason for the limited success of 
Manlove test probably lies in difficulties with both application and 
proof of the various elements. When triggering application of the 
test, the plaintiff must prove the presence of an unmistakable 
emergency and reliance on a well-established custom.127 These fac-
tors, however, merely establish the duty to treat. Plaintiff must 
then prove the remaining elements of a common-law tort action: 
breach of duty, consequent harm and proximate cause.128 Ironi-
cally, the very nature of a true emergency may increase the diffi-
culty of proof.129 
120. Annot., Liability of Hospital for Refusal to Admit or Treat Patient, 35 A.L.R.3d 
841, 844, 846 (1971). 
121. 638 S.W.2d 111 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1982, writ rerd n.r.e.). 
122. Id. at 113-14. 
123. Id. at 114. 
124. Id. at 114 n.l. 
125. Id. (relying on Annot., supra note 120, at 841). 
126. Id. 
127. Refer to notes 90-92 supra and accompanying text. 
128. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 15, at 164-65. 
129. The Manlove court concluded: 
If plaintiff cannot adduce evidence showing some incompetency of the nurse, 
or some breach of duty or some negligence his case must fail. Like the learned 
judge below, we sympathize with the plaintiff in their loss of a child; but this 
natural feeling does not permit us to find liability in the absence of satisfactory 
evidence. 
54 Del. at 26-27, 174 A.2d at 141. Refer also to note 167 infra and accompanying text. 
HeinOnline -- 26 Hous. L. Rev. 41 1989
1989] EMERGENCY CARE 41 
Hill v. Ohio County130 is an example of the difficulties encoun-
tered in establishing a duty to treat. In Hill, plaintiff's decedent 
arrived at the local public hospital concerned about giving birth 
before reaching her doctor in lllinois.131 The nurse in charge was 
unable to get either the "on-duty" physician or the "on-call" phy-
sician to treat an obstetrics case.132 Decedent was referred to other 
hospitals, but elected to go home.133 She gave birth that night, ap-
parently unattended, and called an ambulance in the morning.m 
One of the physicians who had refused treatment the night before 
instructed the ambulance driver to take the mother and child to 
another hospital.135 The mother was dead on arrival.136 In the sub-
sequent wrongful death action, the court found that the hospital's 
rules were such that no patient could be admitted without an order 
from a doctor, and that "[t]he trustees or governing board of a 
public hospital alone determine the right of admission to the bene-
fits of the institution, and their discretion in this regard will not be 
reviewed by the courts."~37 The court also found that no "element 
of critical emergency" was apparent.138 
Hill is an example of a major flaw in the Manlove reliance the-
ory. If the condition of a patient fails to reach the level of an 
"emergency," then an injured plaintiff cannot use the doctrine. 
The Hill court apparently did not characterize labor as a life-
threatening, traumatic, or "unmistakable" emergency.139 
Once the emergency is proven, the next hurdle is proof of reli-
ance on a well-established custom. The Delaware Supreme Court 
itself provided at least a hint as to what would satisfy this require-
ment in Vanaman v. Milford Memorial HospitaU~0 In Vanaman, 
the plaintiff alleged that the defendant physician improperly set 
130. 468 S.W.2d 306 (Ky. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1041 {1972). 
131. 468 S.W.2d at 307. 
132. /d. 
133. /d. 
134. /d. 
135. Id. at 308. 
136. /d. 
137. /d. (quoting 40 A~l JuR. 2o Hospitals and Asylums § 12 (1968)). 
138. /d. at 309. Noting that the plaintiff relied on Manloue, the court made no men-
tion of the reliance theory nor of any duty ttl trent in nn emergency, but only quoted the 
"warning" in Manloue that plaintiff needed to prove "some incompetency of the nurse or 
some breach of duty or some negligence." !d. at 308. 
139. The COBRA statute specifically includes active labor within its provisions. Refer 
to note 296 infra and accompanying text. 
140. 272 A.2d 718 (Del. Sup. 1970). 
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her left leg in a cast which was too tight and caused permanent 
injury.141 The main issue on appeal was whether the hospital was 
liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior, even though the 
physician was not its employee.142 Did the hospital represent that 
the physician was its agent or did it merely "refer" the plaintiff to 
the physician, on call in the emergency room ?143 If the hospital 
merely made a "referral" to the physician as an independent con-
tractor, it avoided liability.144 
The plaintiff in Vanaman was actually treated, so Manlove 
appears to be inapplicable. The court cited Manlove, however, and 
noted that the plaintiff offered evidence establishing that the hos-
pital "maintained an emergency facility [and] that facility was of-
fered to the public and the public was directed to it.m•c; Although 
this evidence appears extraneous, it takes on significance in light of 
the fact that the issue was whether the hospital was liable at all for 
plaintiff's treatment. The plaintiff attempted to establish the hos-
pital's liability for treatment received there, irrespective of 
whether it was provided by an independent contractor or by an 
employee. Although the court's holding did not rely on this theory, 
it offered a strong hint as to what might satisfy the "reliance on a 
well-established custom" requirement of the Manlove test. 
A Pennsylvania court's decision in Fabian v. Matzko146 is per-
haps the best example of a court's confusion over the Manlove reli-
ance test.147 In Fabian, the plaintiff developed "an intense and 
sudden headache, stiffness in her neck, and nausea. "148 Her per-
sonal physician examined her and determined that she had a viral 
infection.149 When her condition had not improved several hours 
later, her husband called the hospital and spoke with the emer-
gency room physician, relating his wife's symptoms and indicating 
141. I d. at 719. Factually, the case was a modern day McDonald. Refer to notes 21·23 
supra and accompanying text. 
142. 272 A.2d at 719. Refer to note 8 supra. 
143. 272 A.2d at 720. 
144. Id. 
145. I d. at 720-21. In a footnote, the court referred to the deposition of the hospital's 
administrator, who was questioned concerning the separate status of the emergency room, 
its availability to the general public, and whether the hospital posted and maintained signs 
and directions to the emergency unit. ld. at 721 n.4. 
146. 236 Pa. Super. 267, 344 A.2d 569 (1975). 
147. The majority, a concurrence and a dissent offered conflicting views of its proper 
application. 
148. ld. at 269, 344 A.2d at 570. 
149. ld., 344 A.2d at 570. 
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that he wanted her admitted to the hospital.1110 In accordance with 
hospital policy, the emergency room physician asked if the plaintiff 
had seen a physician, and informed the husband that she could not 
be admitted unless the arrangements were made by their personal 
physician.151 The husband tried, but was unable, to contact their 
doctor.152 
Over the next several days, the plaintiff's condition seemed to 
improve, but she then suffered another attack and was admitted to 
the hospital by her physician.153 An examination revealed a "cere-
bral hemorrhage with permanent brain damage, loss of speech, 
partial paralysis, loss of hearing and loss of vision. mM The plaintiff 
alleged that the injuries were caused by the hospital's negligence in 
failing to admit and treat her, relying on Manlove and section 323 
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. 1115 
The court first rejected section 323 as a basis for liability, stat-
ing that the emergency room physician never undertook to render 
medical services.156 The court then considered the A1anlove and 
Stanturf57 decisions, characterizing them as "concerned with the 
fact that a person in need of immediate medical care uses valuable 
time when he goes to an emergency facility.m118 The court found 
the Manlove test inapplicable, stating: 
In the present case, appellant did not rely on a policy of render-
ing emergency care. Appellant did not go to the hospital, and 
thus did not waste valuable time. Furthermore, this was not an 
unmistakable emergency. In fact, there were no facts which would 
have indicated to Dr. Cahill that this was an emergency situa-
tion. . . . Finally the hospital in this case did not depart from 
one of its standard procedures, as did the hospital in Stantur{.111D 
Given that the plaintiff never actually went to the emergency 
room, one can understand why the court was reluctant to hold the 
hospital liable. 
Fabian is otherwise factually comparable to Manlove, but il-
150. Id., 344 A.2d at 570. 
151. Id., 344 A.2d at 570. 
152. Id., 344 A.2d at 570. 
153. Id., 344 A.2d at 570. 
154. Id. at 269-70, 344 A.2d at 570. 
155. Id. at 270, 344 A.2d at 571. 
156. Jd., 344 A.2d at 570. 
157- Refer to notes 112-19 supra and accompanying text. 
158. 236 Pa. Super. at 271-72, 344 A.2d at 572. 
159. Id. at 273, 344 A.2d at 572. 
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lustrative of the limitations of applying the reliance test. First, 
does "valuable time" refer to the time it takes to drive to and ap-
ply for treatment at the emergency room or to the time lost in not 
seeking further aid?160 Of course, since the plaintiffs did not actu-
ally go to the hospital, the emergency room physician had no 
chance to examine the plaintiff. The lack of an opportunity to ex-
amine is the legitimate reason for the court's refusal to impose lia-
bility. The question left open in Manlove, however, becomes perti-
nent here. Is there a duty to actually examine a patient in 
determining the presence or absence of an emergency, 161 or are 
symptoms related by a third party sufficient? Perhaps the courts 
are afraid to impose such a requirement because an examination 
may be enough to establish a relationship with the patient.162 Once 
the relationship is established, a duty to the patient is also 
established.163 
In addition, the Fabian court appears to have misinterpreted 
the Manlove requirements for proving reliance. The court found 
that the Manlove test was based on the concern that "the injured 
person's condition will deteriorate because he relied on the hospi-
160. The dissent notes that the plaintiff was told, "[y]ou are not a doctor to make a 
diagnosis; if your doctor said it is a virus, it is a virus." /d. at 278, 344 A.2d at 575. Was not 
valuable time lost in a reassurance that an apparently serious condition was only a virus? 
161. Another problem with the Fabian court's analysis lies in its assertion that no 
unmistakable emergency was apparent. Both the concurrence and the dissent agreed that 
this was a jury question. 236 Pa. Super. at 273, 277, 344 A.2d at 572, 576. 
162. Refer to the discussion of Richard v. Adair Hosp. Found. Corp., 566 S.W.2d 791 
(Ky. App. 1978) in notes 199-208 infra and accompanying text. 
163. As noted above, the concurring judge agreed with the dissent that an emergency 
may have been present, but based his concurrence on the finding that the emergency room 
physician did not undertake to render medical care via the phone call. In other words, no 
"sufficient relationship" was established. 236 Pa. Super. at 276, 344 A.2d at 574. This reu· 
soning is more plausible than the majority opinion, but it comes very close to reverting to 
the common-law rule that a private hospital may refuse to establish any relationship and 
will thereby not be held liable. 
The dissent, on the other hand, found that it was at least possible that the emergency 
room physician undertook to establish a relationship by "confirming [a] medical diagnosis 
based upon an evaluation of the recited symptoms." /d. at 279, 344 A.2d at 575. This is 
reminiscent of the O'Neill court's attempt to find a hospital-patient relationship via a 
nurse's phone call on behalf of the patient. Refer to notes 54-60 supra and accompanying 
text. The dissent also found that the rule relied upon by the plaintiffs was that a "hospital 
which maintains an emergency room is under a duty to recognize and respond to a genuine 
medical emergency." 236 Pa. Super. at 276, 344 A.2d at 575. This characterization, of course, 
ignores the reliance element of the Manlove test. 
The COBRA statute requires an examination of the patient to determine if an emer· 
gency condition exists. Refer to note 296 infra and accompanying text. 
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tal's policy of rendering emergency care."184 With these words, the 
court incorporated a fact in Stanturf6r. as a requirement in meet-
ing the reliance test. Reliance on a well-established custom to 
render aid may be very different from reliance on a particular hos-
pital's admitted policy to render aid in emergencies. A policy may 
serve as evidence of a custom, but the requirement that a policy be 
in existence and subsequently broken narrows the .Manlove test al-
most to an impossibility. Further, the hospital policy in Fabian-
no admittance. except by personal physician-is the same policy 
evidenced in Manlove and common to many hospitals 
nationwide.188 
Even if the plaintiff establishes a duty under Jt.fanlove and its 
breach, he still has the difficult burden of proving causation. Ruvio 
v. North Broward Hospital District161 illustrates the problem. 
Ruvio sought admission to North Broward Hospital two days after 
suffering a coronary infarction, but was told that he was not an 
emergency case and could be admitted only under doctor's or-
ders.188 After leaving the hospital, Ruvio went to his physician's 
office and made arrangements for his immediate admittance.109 
Ruvio was, in fact, in an emergency condition and died 48 hours 
after his admission to the hospital.110 
The wrongful death action claimed the hospital had wrong-
fully refused Ruvio admission, and the focus on appeal was proxi-
mate cause.171 There was expert testimony on the record that the 
delay in admission would not have made any difference in Ruvio's 
condition. The court held that the plaintiff, Ruvio's widow, "failed 
to establish that any action or inaction on the part of the hospital 
was the proximate cause of the death . . . or that there was any 
breach of duty on the part of the hospital staff."172 The court then 
cited Manlove, stating that "[t]he same conclusion was reached in 
164. 236 Pa. Super. at 272, 344 A.2d at 572 (emphasis added). 
165. 447 S.W.2d at 562 (Mo. 1969). Refer to notes 112-19 supra and accompan}ing 
text. 
166. Manlove, 54 Del at 17, 174 A.2d at 136. Refer to note 8 supra and accompanying 
text. 
167. 186 So. 2d 45 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 195 So. 2d 567 (Fla. 1966). 
168. 186 So. 2d at 45. 
169. Id. 
170. Id. 
171. Id. at 46. 
172. ld. 
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a case involving similar circumstances."173 
The court's statement is somewhat puzzling. Obviously, the 
overall conclusions reached in Manlove and Ruvio are different, 
since Manlove was remanded to determine if an unmistakable 
emergency existed.174 The Florida court seems to refer to the fol-
lowing language in Manlove: 
We should add, however, that if plaintiff cannot adduce evidence 
showing some incompetency of the nurse, or some breach of duty 
or some negligence, his case must fail. . . . [W]e sympathize with 
the parents in their loss . . . but this natural feeling does not per-
mit us to find liability in the absence of satisfactory evidence.m 
Thus, a plaintiff's burden of proving an unmistakable emer-
gency and reliance on a well-established custom is just the begin-
ning. She must then prove that the refusal to treat caused or ag-
gravated the harm. In emergencies, particularly where death 
results, such evidence may be very difficult to establish. 
3. Accommodations: Capturing the 11Spirit" of Manlove. Be-
cause of, or perhaps in spite of, the problems of application, some 
courts have cited Manlove in order to find a duty to provide emer-
gency care; but they have disregarded the finer points of the reli-
ance test, as evidenced by the use of Manlove in cases in which the 
patient was legally admitted.176 Mter finding an existing hospital-
patient relationship, these courts declined to discuss reliance on a 
well-established custom, leaving unclear whether these courts 
would have required reliance in the absence of such admission.177 
For example, soon after Manlove was decided, a Mississippi 
court faced a compelling set of facts in New Biloxi Hospital, Inc. v. 
Frazier.178 A black179 veteran was rushed by ambulance to the 
173. ld. 
174. 54 Del. at 26, F4 A.2d at 141. 
175. 54 Del. at 26-27, 174 A.2d at 141. 
176. See, e.g., LeJuene Road Hosp., Inc. v. Watson, 171 So. 2d 202, 204 n.5 (Fin. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1965); New Biloxi Hosp., Inc. v. Frazier, 245 Miss. 185, 186, 146 So. 2d 882, 887-88 
(1962). Refer to notes 185-86, 196, 207 & 212 infra and accompanying text. 
177. Refer to notes 188 & 195 infra and accompanying text. 
178. 245 Miss. 185, 146 So. 2d 882 (1962). 
179. Racism, as well as economic factors, plays a role in the denial of care. Sec gcncr· 
ally Equal Access, supra note 2, at 3-4 (majority of dumped patients are minorities). Fra· 
zier preceded the passage of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 
§601, 78 Stat. 252-53 (1982), but later cases have raised racial discrimination claims without 
success. See, e.g., Campbell v. Mincey, 413 F. Supp. 16, 21 (N.D. Miss. 1975) (plaintiff's race 
and indigency unrelated to hospital's refusal to treat), a/f'd, 542 F.2d 573 (5th Cir. 1976). 
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emergency room, bleeding profusely from a gunshot wound.180 The 
nurse took his blood pressure and pulse and summoned the doctor, 
neglecting to inform the doctor of the amount of blood lost.181 The 
doctor arranged for transfer to a Veteran's Administration hospi-
tal.182 Meanwhile, the wounded veteran lapsed into shock after two 
hours in the emergency room.183 The doctor did nothing to stop 
the bleeding, and the veteran died shortly after the transfer to the 
V.A. hospital.184 
In the wrongful death action, the court found that the hospital 
received and recorded the veteran as an emergency room pa-
tient.185 Citing numerous cases, including Manlove and O'Neill, the 
court stated, "Under such circumstances, the [h]ospital and its em-
ployees had a duty to use reasonable care in protecting his life and 
well-being.11186 
Under the facts of Frazier, the Manlove reliance theory was 
not dispositive. Frazier was a negligence case and the evidence 
supported the holding that the decedant bled to death in the hos-
pital's emergency room due to the negligence of the hospital's 
nurses and doctor.187 The court found that a hospital-patient rela-
tionship existed concurrently with the duty to provide reasonable 
care under the circumstances.186 
A similar analysis appears in LeJuene Road Hospital, Inc. v. 
Watson.169 A mother, on the advice of her doctor, took her minor 
son to the hospital for an operation to remove his appendix.100 The 
boy was taken upstairs to the examining room, undressed, ex-
amined and given medication.191 Mter two hours, a hospital em-
ployee required them to leave, apparently because of their inability 
Refer to notes 233-41 infra and accompanying text. 
180. 245 Miss. at 193, 146 So. 2d at 885. 
181. Id., 146 So. 2d at 885-86. 
182. Id. at 195, 146 So. 2d at 886. 
183. Id. at 194, 146 So. 2d at 886. 
184. Id., 146 So. 2d at 886. 
185. Id., 146 So. 2d at 887. 
186. Id. at 198, 146 So. 2d at 887-88 (citing, among other sources, both Wilmington 
Gen. Hosp. v. Manlove, 54 DeL 15, 174 A.2d 135 (1961), and O'Neill v. Montefiore Hasp., 11 
A.D.2d 132, 202 N.Y.S.2d 436 (N.Y. App. Div. 1960)). 
187. Id. at 195, 146 So. 2d at 886. 
188. Id. at 198, 146 So. 2d at 887. 
189. 171 So. 2d 202 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965). 
190. Id. at 203. 
191. /d. 
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to pay a two hundred dollar admittance fee.192 The child was 
transferred to a public hospital for the necessary operation.193 
In the wrongful discharge suit, the court first miscited Crews 
for the proposition that "it is permissible for a private hospital to 
reject for whatever reason, or no reason at all, any applicant for 
medical and hospital services."~9" The court then distinguished the 
case at bar on the fact that the hospital physically and "legally 
admitted" the boy, establishing a basis for liability.19c; 
Watson does not appear to rely on Manlove, but the court re-
fers the reader to the Delaware decision in a puzzling footnote, and 
declines to discuss a hospital's obligation to an emergency pa-
tient.196 Rather than depend on the Manlove reliance test, which 
the court could have applied, it apparently felt safer characterizing 
the facts as an admission and applying traditional negligence 
terms. 
Other courts have found a duty to treat emergencies in cases 
lacking evidence of a hospital-patient relationship.197 These courts, 
accepting the "spirit" of Manlove, make no mention of, nor require 
reliance on a well-established custom.198 
In Richard v. Adair Hospital Foundation Corp.,199 the plain-
tiff brought his daughter to the emergency room twice in one day, 
leaving without treatment each time. 200 The nurse first declined to 
examine the infant, but on the second trip felt her head before 
deciding there was no emergency.201 The child's condition wors-
ened and the next day another hospital admitted her.202 The diag-
nosis was bronchial pneumonia and although the hospital adminis-
192. ld. 
193. ld. 
194. ld. (citing Birmingham Baptist Hasp. v. Crews, 229 Ala. 398, 157 So. 224 (1934) 
(private hospital owes no duty to admit contagious patient in violation of its rules)). 
195. Refer to note 61 supra. 
196. 171 So. 2d at 203-04 n.5 "what has been said above [distinguishing Crews and 
finding an admission to the hospital] does not in any way affect a hospital's obligation when 
presented with an emergency patient. For an excellent discussion of the law applicable 
thereto, see Wilmington General Hospital v. Manlove." 
197. See, e.g., Richard v. Adair Hasp. Found. Corp., 566 S.W.2d 791,792 (Ky. Ct. App. 
1978); Mercy Medical Center of Oshkosh, Inc. v. Winnebago County, 58 Wis. 2d 260, 263, 
206 N.W.2d 198, 200-01 (1973). 
198. Refer to notes 199-212 infra and accompanying text. 
199. 566 S.W.2d 791 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978). 
200. Id. at 792. 
201. ld. 
202. Id. 
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tered emergency treatment, she died within five hours.203 
In the wrongful death action, an expert testified that the 
child's chances of recovery would have been substantially greater 
had she been treated earlier.20' In reversing a summary judgment 
for the defendant, the court stated that "[i]n a non-emergency sit-
uation there is no duty on the part of a county hospital to admit or 
treat a patient .... "205 The court recognized an exception to the 
general rule in the case of emergencies, citing Manlove for the pro-
position that pneumonia may rise to the level of an emergency sit-
uation.208 The court left the ultimate question of liability to the jury.207 
Richard fails to mention reliance or a custom to render emer-
gency care, noting only that liability may be predicated on refusal 
to treat in an emergency situation and that pneumonia was an 
emergency under the circumstances.208 The court was obviously 
less concerned with requiring proof of a well-established custom 
than with accepting the moral and ethical basis, or the "spirit," of 
Manlove. 
The "spirit" of Manlove possessed the Supreme Court of Wis-
consin in Mercy Medical Center v. Winnebago County.209 The case 
was an action to recover the cost of emergency hospital treatment 
from the county.210 Holding the county liable, the court discussed 
the patient,.s right to treatment.211 Citing Manlove and recounting 
essentially the entire history of the issue, the court concluded: 
[T]he courts holding a hospital liable for failure to give emer-
gency treatment are still in the minority .... We think, however, 
that today, without [sic] our society's emphasis upon a concern 
for the health of its citizens, private hospitals with emergency 
wards and facilities for emergency services have a duty to admit 
those in need of aid. It would shock the public conscience if a 
person in need of medical emergency aid would be turned down 
at the door of a hospital having emergency service because that 
203. Id. 
204. Id. 
205. Id. at 793. 
206. Id. 
207. Id. (the question was "whether appellee was negligent in twice refusing hospital 
admission to the infant ... when an unmistakable situation may have existed"). 
208. Id. 
209. 58 Wis. 2d 260, 206 N.W.2d 198 (1973). 
210. Id. at 261, 206 N.W.2d at 198. 
211. Id. at 262, 206 N.W.2d at 200-01. 
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person could not at that moment assure payment for the service. 
The public expects such service. . . . 212 
While certain jurisdictions have cited Manlove for one pro-
position or another, the reliance test did not significantly expand 
the duty to treat in an emergency. Contrary to the predictions, 
Manlove did not gain nationwide judicial acceptance as an enforce-
ment tool to expand the right to emergency care. 
III. THE GUERRERO CASE: THE SEARCH FOR AN ALTERNATIVE 
THEORY 
In 1975, the Arizona Supreme Court summarily rejected the 
Manlove theory, embraced by the Arizona Court of Appeals,213 and 
replaced it with a theory of its own. In Guerrero v. Copper Queen 
Hospital,214 two children received severe burns when a stove ex-
ploded in their home in Mexico.2111 The Guerreros brought them 
for treatment to the Copper Queen Hospital, located close to the 
Mexican border.216 The hospital refused treatment, forcing a trip 
to another hospital.217 The children sued through a guardian ad 
litem, alleging that the delay in treatment caused them to suffer 
additional injury and prolonged convalescence.218 
The Guerreros urged the court to adopt the rule set forth in 
Manlove.219 The defendants asserted the common-law rule that a 
private hospital is under no obligation to accept any patient.220 
The court found the parties' reliance on either rule misplaced, 
holding that "[a] private hospital has no duty to accept a patient 
or serve everyone unless a different public policy has been declared 
by statute or otherwise."221 
The court then advanced an argument neither briefed nor ar-
gued by the plaintiffs,222 borrowing from the theoretical basis of 
212. ld. at 267-68, 206 N.W.2d at 201. 
213. 22 Ariz. App. 611, 612, 529 P.2d 1205, 1206 (1974). 
214. 112 Ariz. 104, 537 P.2d 1329 (1975). 
215. ld. at 105, 537 P.2d at 1330. 
216. ld., 537 P.2d at 1330. 
217. Id., 537 P.2d at 1330. 
218. ld., 537 P.2d at 1330. 
219. ld., 537 P.2d at 1330. 
220. ld. at 105-06, 537 P.2d at 1330-31. The hospital was a division of the Phelps 
Dodge Corporation. ld. at 105, 537 P.2d at 1330. 
221. ld. at 106, 537 P.2d at 1331 (emphasis added). 
222. Id. at 107, 537 P.2d at 1332 (Struckmeyer, C.J., concurring). 
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the Superior Court opinion in Manlove.223 The court found that 
"[t]he character of private hospitals in Arizona has been changed 
by statute and regulations."224 The court noted that privat~ hospi-
tals must be licensed by the state to operate, that the state board 
of health had authority to adopt rules and regulations for licensed 
hospitals, and that since 1964 regulations required a general hospi-
tal to maintain an emergency room.2211 Thus, the court held that 
Arizona public policy required a general hospital to maintain facili-
ties for the provision of emergency care, and "that such a hospital 
may not deny emergency care without cause."226 
With this duty clearly established, the court rejected the hos-
pital's attempt to come within the protection of Arizona's Good 
Samaritan statute, which immunizes individuals from liability for 
withholding aid in emergency situations.227 The court held the 
statute inapplicable to emergency medical treatment, since the 
hospital had a public duty to provide emergency services.228 
Guerrero offers an alternative theory for establishing a duty to 
treat emergencies. Arizona licensing laws altered the common-law 
no-duty rule by requiring the maintenance of emergency services 
for the public benefit, without regard for ability to pay. Because 
the Manlove theory garnered only limited acceptance nationwide, 
and because the hospital industry was highly regulated, numerous 
statutes, regulations, and bylaws existed on which to base this the-
ory of liability. 
In Thompson v. Sun City Community Hospital, /nc.,229 the 
Arizona Supreme Court affirmed and expanded Guerrero.230 The 
opinion reiterated the rule that "licensed hospitals in this state are 
required to accept and r~nder emergency care to all patients who 
223. Refer to notes 68-76 supra and accompanying text. 
224. 112 Ariz. at 106, 537 P.2d at 1331. 
225. Id., 537 P.2d at 1331. 
226. Id., 537 P.2d at 1331. The concurring opinion urged the acceptance or the 
Manlove rule, arguing that the majority's statutory argument was not properly raised in the 
lower court and should not serve as the basis for the decision. Id. at 107, 537 P.2d at 1332 
(Struckmeyer, C.J., concurring). 
227. Id. at 106, 537 P.2d at 1331. 
228. I d., 537 P.2d at 1331. For further discussion of the application or Good Samaritan 
laws to emergency room settings, refer to notes 355-63 infra and accompanying text-
229. 141 Ariz. 597, 688 P.2d 605 (1984). 
230. Id. at 602, 688 P.2d at 610. See also Hiser v. Randolph, 126 Ariz. 608, 611, 617 
P.2d 774, 777 (1980) (physician contractually bound to bylaws and rules or hospital obli-
gated to treat emergency room patients). 
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present themselves in need of such care."231 It further established 
that in Arizona, there are only three possible defenses to the denial 
of emergency care: (1) the hospital is not obligated or capable 
under its state license to provide the needed emergency care; (2) 
there is a valid medical cause to refuse emergency care; or (3) 
there is no true emergency.232 
The Guerrero approach has met with less success in other ju-
risdictions. An example is Campbell v. Mincey,233 decided shortly 
after Guerrero. The plaintiff was a black woman, in labor, who was 
refused treatment by Marshall County Hospital. 234 She gave birth 
to her son in the hospital parking lot, in the front seat of a neigh-
bor's car. 235 Plaintiff based her claim, in part, on the violation of 
certain state statutes which mainly dealt with the licensing re-
quirements for Mississippi hospitals.236 The court, however, found 
that these statutes were "irrelevant to the issues litigated in the 
cause."237 The one statute the court did find "germane" to the is-
sues required hospitals to comply with certain rules and regula-
tions promulgated by the Mississippi Commission on Hospital 
Care or face revocation of their licenses.238 The court decided, how-
ever, that the regulations imposed duties only upon the hospital, 
and not its managers or employees.239 The hospital was not a party 
defendant to the suit. 240 
The Campbell court also recognized a common-law "trend" to-
ward imposing liability on hospitals for refusing to treat in emer-
gency situations, but found that these cases all involved an arbi-
trary refusal to treat which was a 
marked departure from previous hospital custom and procedure. 
The refusal of the staff of the Marshall County hospital to admit 
or treat the plaintiffs here was in compliance with, rather than a 
departure from hospital policy not to admit patients who are not 
231. 141 Ariz. at 602, 688 P.2d at 610. 
232. Id. at 603, 688 P.2d at 611. 
233. 413 F. Supp. 16 (N.D. Miss. 1975), aff'd mem, 542 F.2d 573 (5th Cir. 1976). 
234. 413 F. Supp. at 18. 
235. Id. at 19. 
236. !d. The plaintiff also alleged racial discrimination, but the court rejected her con· 
tention as against the weight of the evidence. Id. at 21-22. 
237. ld. at 19. 
238. Id. 
239. Id. 
240. ld. at 20. 
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referred by local physicians. 241 
In making this statement, the court is simply ·wrong, or at 
least confused. Several cases following the "trend" involved hospi-
tals with an admittance policy similar to that of Marshall County 
Hospital.242 Admittance as an in-patient following emergency 
treatment was not an issue. 
In addition, the Campbell court emphasized that no physical 
harm or injury resulted to either plaintiff or her son, which the 
court considered as proof that there was not an emergency.243 The 
birth was "normal in all respects other than the location and the 
absence of a doctor at the immediate time of the birth."244 There-
fore, the plaintiff's active labor was not a "true" emergency, and 
hospital admission regulations were inapplicable under the circum-
stances.245 Campbell was a major set back for legal advocates who 
hoped that Campbell would further the trend toward establishing 
a duty to provide emergency care. 
In fact, the Guerrero approach had little impact outside Ari-
zona.246 Also, while Guerrero did not involve the same application 
problems that plagued the Manlove test, it required courts to 
make the leap from statutes and regulations-designating certain 
standards for hospital licensing-to a duty to treat any and all per-
sons in need of emergency care, based on broad public policy con-
cerns. Morally, the connection is desirable, but legally, it required 
the creation of a private cause of action implied from state licens-
ing statutes. Particularly in light of the perceived malpractice "cri-
sis" in the mid-1970s, courts may have been reluctant to expand 
duties without specific guidance from the legislature. 
IV. STATE LAw AND FEDERAL HILL-BURTON: Ln~uTED IMPACT 
A. State Legislation 
Almost half of the states have legislation requiring hospitals to 
241. Id. at 20. 
242. See, e.g., Manlove, 54 Del. at 17, 174 A.2d at 136; Hill, 468 S.W.2d at 308; 
Fabian, 236 Pa. Super. at 269, 344 A.2d at 570. Refer to notes 65, 137 & 151 supra and 
accompanying text. 
243. 413 F. Supp. at 21. 
244. Id. at 19. 
245. Id. at 22-23. 
246. The reason is not completely clear, but may be due to the fact that Guerrero 
depended on Arizona statutory policy with little precedential value elsewhere. 
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provide emergency care regardless of ability to pay, some requiring 
that patients be in stable condition before transfer to another 
hospital. 247 
As early as 1927, Illinois law required that every licensed hos-
pital "which provides general medical and surgical hospital ser-
vices shall provide a hospital emergency service . . . and shall fur-
nish such hospital emergency services to any applicant who applies 
for the same in case of injury or acute medical condition where the 
same is liable to cause death or severe injury or serious illness. "248 
This statute has never been successfully applied to establish a pri-
vate cause of action for failure to treat a patient.249 Furthermore, 
the law lacks effective public enforcement. Cook County Hospital 
physicians continue to report an increase in "dumping" of emer-
gency patients from the private hospitals in Chicago. 2 G0 
In recent years, a few states have passed "antidumping" laws 
requiring hospitals to give emergency room patients the care neces-
sary to stabilize their condition and regulating the manner of 
transfer from one hospital to another, regardless of ability to 
pay.251 The various approaches include providing for notice to pa-
247. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CoDE §§ 1317, 1317.2-.2a, 1798.170-.172 (West 
Supp. 1988); CoLO. REv. STAT. §§ 26-15-101 to -104, -106 (Supp. 1987); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 
395.0143-.0145, 401.45 (West 1986 & Supp. 1988); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 31-8-40 to -46 (1985); 
HAW. REV. STAT. § 321-232(b) (1985); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 2168.400(1)-.990(3) (Michie/ 
Hobbs-Merrill 1982); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 40.2113.4(A)-(B), -2113.6 (West Supp. 1988); 
MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 111, § 70E(k), (n) (West 1983 & Supp. 1988); MICH. CoMP. LAWS 
ANN. §§ 333.20703, -.20704(4), -.20715 (West Supp. 1987); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 68-39-301, -
302, -511(12) (1987); TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4438a (Vernon Supp. 1988); UTAH CoDE 
ANN. §§ 26-8-2(11), -811) (1984); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 146.301 (West Supp. 1987); Wvo. STAT. § 
35-2-115(a) (1977). 
248. ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 111 Y2, para. 86 (Smith-Hurd 1977). 
249. In Johnson v. St. Bernard Hosp., 79 Ill. App. 3d 709, 399 N.E.2d 198 (1979), the 
Appellate Court of Illinois held that the statute did not impose a duty upon a hospital to 
assume responsibility for the practice of medicine within an independently operated emer-
gency room. 399 N.E.2d at 203. The refusal of treatment actually occurred, however, after 
the hospital admitted the patient. ld. at 200. The suit also alleged a claim of negligent 
emergency room care. ld. at 204. 
Other cases discussing the statute deal only with questions of payment for an indigent's 
emergency care. Methodist Medical Center v. Ingram, 82 Ill. 2d 511, 413 N.E.2d 402, 406 
(1980); Lazzara v. Dreyer Medical Clinic, 120 Ill. App. 3d 721, 458 N.E.2d 958, 960-61 
(1983); Gasbarra v. St. James Hosp., 85 Ill. App. 3d 32, 406 N.E.2d 544, 551-52 (1979); St. 
John's Hosp. of the Hosp. Sisters of the Third Order of St. Francis v. Town of Capital, 75 
Ill. App. 2d 222, 226, 220 N.E.2d 333, 335 (1966). 
250. Ansell & Schiff, Patient Dumping, 257 J. AMA. 1500, 1500 (1987). 
251. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CoDE §§ 1317, 1317.2-.2a, 1798.170,-.172 (West Supp. 
1988); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 395.0144 (West Supp. 1988); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40.2113.6(C) 
(West Supp. 1988); MD. HEALTH-GEN. CoDE ANN. § 19-308.2 (1987); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. 
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tients of their rights to treatment; strengthening enforcement 
mechanisms, including private causes of action; and creating penal-
ties for failure to comply.252 
A few state approaches are illustrative. In Massachusetts, the 
"Patient's Bill of Rights" provides a right to prompt life-saving 
treatment in an emergency regardless of ability to pay.2113 There-
quirement to provide this care is extended to both the health care 
facility and the physician in the facility. 2114 Treatment may not be 
delayed to discuss payment if such delay imposes material risk to 
the potential patient.255 A recent amendment to this law provides 
the patient with a right to "prompt and safe transfer to a facility 
which agrees to receive and treat such patient.mna The statute rec-
ognizes that a private cause of action may be filed by a person 
whose rights have been violated. 257 The statute makes no clear pro-
vision for state-imposed penalties.258 
California recently passed comprehensive legislation that man-
dates all licensed health care facilities with emergency depart-
ments to provide emergency services to any person requesting care 
for an emergency condition.259 The emergency services shall be 
rendered without first questioning the person about his or her abil-
ity to pay.26° Further, the statute provides for the recovery of 
"damages, reasonable attorneys' fees, and other appropriat-e relier' 
in a civil action.261 The health facility, its employees and physi-
cians, dentists, and podiatrists, however, shall not be liable if the 
refusal of services "is based on the determination, exercising rea-
sonable care, that the person is not suffering from an emergency 
medical condition . . . . "262 
ch. 111, § 70E(n) (West Supp. 1988); 35 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 449.8(a) (Purdon Supp. 
1988); TENN. CoDE ANN.§ 68-11-701 to -705 (1987); TEx. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. nrt. 4437f, §§ 
5(b) & (d), 9c (Vernon Supp. 1988). 
252. Waxman & Dorn, States Take the Lead in Preuenting Patient Dumping, 22 
CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 136, 136 (1988). 
253. !\.1Ass. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 111, § 70E (West 1983 & Supp. 1988). 
254. Id. §§ 70E(a) & (k). 
255. Id. § 70E(k). 
256. Id. § 70E(n). 
257. Id. § 70E. 
258. Id. 
259. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CoDE § 1317(a) (West Supp. 1988). 
260. Id. § 1317(d). 
261. Id. § 1317.6(f). 
262. Id. § 1317.6(g). Florida recently adopted a similar emergency cnrc statute. FLA. 
STAT. ANN.§ 395.0144 (West Supp. 1988). 
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In Texas, state law provides that all general hospitals must 
provide emergency services to patients regardless of ability to 
pay.263 The Texas Hospital Licensing Law and its implementing 
regulations also provide comprehensive emergency transfer stan-
dards.264 A strict enforcement scheme allows any person harmed by 
the failure of a hospital "to timely adopt, implement, or enforce a 
patient transfer policy" to seek injunctive relief or "remedies for 
civil damages existing under current common law."265 
Most state laws, however, do not recognize the right of an in-
jured party to sue the hospital for failure to comply. Without ex-
press statutory authority, courts are reluctant to create such a 
right. For example, New York has a statute requiring general hos-
pitals to admit and provide emergency medical treatment to all in 
immediate need, without advance payment or questioning as to 
payment.266 In Quijije v. Lutheran Medical Center,267 the plaintiff 
sued a public hospital for failure to "render timely medical treat-
ment to plaintiffs' infant daughter when advance payment there-
fore could not be made. "268 The court struck down a motion to 
amend the complaint and assert a cause of action on behalf of the 
mother, individually, for emotional distress arising from observing 
the suffering and death of her baby.269 In asserting the additional 
cause of action, the mother relied on the statute noted above, but 
the court held that it provided an insufficient basis for the claim, 
noting that "if [the statute] creates any specific duty at all, such 
duty would run from the hospital to the individual needing medi-
cal care. m 7 o 
In fact, most state laws have limited enforcement potential. 
First, many laws still lack implementing regulations. The defini-
tion of an emergency lacks clarity or is defined too narrowly. Many 
state laws do not address the problems of transfer that arise from a 
lack of appropriate services, and most laws allow transfer after 
"stabilization," a term often used to justify economic, not medical, 
263. TEx. REv. C1v. STAT. ANN. art. 4438a (Vernon Supp. 1988). 
264. ld. art. 4437f, §§ 5(b)-(d), 9c (Vernon 1976 & Supp. 1988). 
265. ld. § 9c. 
266. N.Y. Pus. HEALTH LAw § 2805-b (McKinney 1985 & Supp. 1987). See also People 
v. Flushing Hosp. & Medical Center, 122 Misc. 2d 260, 471 N.Y.S. 2d 745 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 
1983). 
267. 92 A.D.2d 935; 460 N.Y.S.2d 600 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983). 
268. ld. at 935, 460 N.Y.S. 2d at 600. 
269. ld. at 935-36, 460 N.W.S.2d at 600-01. 
270. Id. at 936, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 601. 
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reasons.271 In addition, state laws experience little meaningful en-
forcement. Only a few states levy fines, usually minimal, for viola-
tions.272 Given the failure of the common law and most state legis-
lation to uniformly mandate a duty, can federal legislation provide 
the solution? 
B. Hill-Burton: An Ineffective Approach 
With its passage in 1946, the Hospital Survey and Construc-
tion Act, commonly referred to as the Hill-Burton Act, provided 
federal funds for the construction and modernization of public and 
private nonprofit health care facilities.273 Over half the hospitals 
nationwide received assistance.274 In consideration for funds, Hill-
Burton hospitals must provide a certain percentage of uncompen-
satec~ care for twenty years and continue to satisfy certain commu-
nity service obligations.2711 
The community service obligations prevent a Hill-Burton fa-
cility from denying emergency services to any person who resides, 
or for Title XVI facilities, works, in the facility's service area be-
cause that person is unable to pay.276 A facility may discharge or 
transfer a person to another facility for necessary treatment only 
after appropriate personnel determine that the transfer will not 
subject the person to a substantial risk of deterioration in medical 
condition.277 
271. See Ansell & Schiff, supra note 250, at 1500-02; see also Equal Access, supra 
note 2, at 106 (statement of Arnold Reiman, M.D., Editor, NEw ENGLAND JoURNAL OP 
MEDICINE). 
272. Dowell, Indigent Access to Hospital Emergency Room Services, 18 CLEARING· 
HOUSE REV. 483, 487 (1984). 
273. 42 U.S.C. § 291 (1982); 42 C.F.R. § 124 (1979). 
274. Dowell, supra note 272, at 487. 
275. 42 U.S.C. § 291c(e) (1982); see generally Wing, The Community Service Obliga-
tion of Hill-Burton Health Facilities, 23 B.C.L. REv. 577, 597 (1982) ("[T]o conclude •.• 
that Congress could not have intended to condition receipt of funds on the provision of 
either uncompensated service or ... community service, is simply a leap or logic not justi-
fied by any reading of the legislative history •.•• ").The 20-year limitation is not expressly 
part of the statute. American Hosp. Ass'n v. Schweiker, 721 F.2d 170, 181 (7th Cir. 1933). 
276. 42 C.F.R. § 124.603 (1979). 
277. Id. The regulations do not define the term "emergency," but the Office or Civil 
Rights (OCR) of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) provides in its pol-
icy manual that emergency services are those "necessary to prevent the death or serious 
impairment of the health of the individual." DEPARTMENT OP HEALTII & HUMAN SERVICES, 
OFFICE OF CIVIL RIGHTS, A GumE TO PLANNING THE HILL-BURTON CoMMUNm' SERVICE CoM-
PLIANCE REVIEw 31 & Tab B (1981) [hereinafter OCR COMMUNITY SERVICE GUIDE) (cited in 
A. FREIFIELD, THE RIGHT TO HEALTH CARE: AN ADVOCATE'S GUIDE TO TilE HILL-BURTON UN-
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Inability to pay is not a valid reason for denying emergency 
service, nor is the fact that the person does not have a physician 
with admitting privileges at the Hill-Burton facility.278 Appropriate 
hospital personnel must at least make a sufficient appraisal of the 
person's condition before denying emergency services or transfer-
ing the patient. 279 
Until the early 1970s, however, hospitals basically ignored 
community service obligations. Legal service advocates looked to 
Hill-Burton obligations as a new source of access for the poor into 
the emergency room. Cook v. Ochsner Foundation Hospital280 es-
tablished that the Hill-Burton Act did, in fact, mandate commu-
nity service obligations.281 Unlike the uncompensated care obliga-
tion, no durational limit attached to community service, including 
the provision of emergency services. 282 In 1983, the Seventh Circuit, 
in American Hospital Association v. Schweiker,283 finally affirmed 
the current regulations, originally issued in 1979, mandating a con-
tinuing obligation to provide community service, including emer-
gency care services to all in a hospital's area, regardless of ability 
COMPENSATED CARE AND CoMMUNITY SERVICES REQUIREMENTS 40 (National Health Law Pro· 
gram 1986) [hereinafter ADvocATE's GuiDE]). Furthermore, the OCR COMMUNITY SERVICE 
GUIDE clarifies that pregnant women who present themselves at an emergency room should 
be accepted for treatment "as soon as labor is established." OCR COMMUNITY SERVICE 
GUIDE, supra, at Tab B. In at least two compliance actions, the Office of Civil Rights hold 
that Hill-Burton hospitals cannot deny service because the women received little or no pro-
natal care. In re Johnston Memorial Hosp., HHS/OCR No. 03813146 (Abingdon, Va., Apr. 7, 
1983); In re St. Francis Hosp. & Medical Center, HHS/OCR No. 07823004 (Topeka, Kan., 
Oct. 29, 1982) (as reported in ADvocATE's GuiDE, supra, at 43-44, 81 n.59). Additionally, an 
examination is required before denial even if the hospital alleges that treatment is unneces-
sary or unavailable. See ADVOCATE's GUIDE, supra, at 40-44. 
278. 42 C.F.R. § 124.603(b)(2) (1979). 
279. Id. §§ 124.603(a)(1) & (b)(1). In Aguinaga v. Castro County Hosp. Dist., Civ. No. 
CA 2-79-205 (N.D. Tex.) (settled Jan. 13, 1984) (as reported in ADVOCATES GuiDE, supra 
note 277, at 44, 82 n.61), an eleven-month-old baby died after the hospital refused admis-
sion for lack of a $450 advance deposit. Id. In the settlement, the hospital agreed to (1) 
provide emergency services regardless of ability to pay; (2) condition hospital privileges on a 
certain amount of emergency care and supervision; (3) transfer patients only if tho other 
hospital agreed to provide the care; and (4) pay for the care of a transfered patient. Id. 
Aguinaga is one of the rare cases when the injured was able to exhaust all administrative 
remedies and file suit against the hospital. 
280. 61 F.R.D. 354 (E.D. La. 1972). 
281. Id. at 360. 
282. Lugo v. Simon, 426 F. Supp. 28, 36 (N.D. Ohio 1976). See 42 U.S.C. § 291c (1982) 
(uncompensated care obligation of twenty years). Prior community service regulations im-
posed a time limit, but Lugo invalidated them. 426 F. Supp. at 36. See also Wing, supra 
note 275. 
283. 721 F.2d 170 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 958 (1984). 
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to pay.2s4 
Court victories have been few and far between.281!1 Attempts to 
bring court action are delayed by the requirement that a complain-
ant must first exhaust all administrative remedies.286 Nor does the 
statute expressly provide for a private right of action. In cases in-
volving an implied private right of action, the statute's vague lan-
guage has sometimes made it difficult for the court to provide 
meaningful remedies.287 As recently as 1985, the Sixth Circuit288 
held that plaintiffs had no cause of action to force investigation or 
effect compliance by the regulated facilities. The Hill-Burton Act 
continues to be plagued with little or no enforcement.289 Legal ad-
vocates on behalf of the poor have been frustrated. Clearly, the 
Hill-Burton Act has not proved to be an effective enforcement tool 
for establishing a duty to provide emergency care.290 
284. 721 F.2d at 178. 
285. See, e.g., Lane v. Lincoln County Hosp., 537 F. Supp. 114, 120 (E.D. Tenn. 1982) 
(current regulations not applicable to hospital, receiving Title VI assistance, that did not 
provide adequate assurances). See also Newsom v. Vanderbilt Univ., 653 F.2d 1100, 1107-10 
(6th Cir. 1981) (failure to comply not proven). 
286. 42 C.F.R. § 124.606(a)(4)(1987). Administrative complaints require dismiSSIIl 
before civil action is proper. I d. The complainant, however, is not notified of their satisfac-
tion of the exhaustion requirements or that a suit is maintainable. ADVOCATE'S GUIDE, supra 
note 277, at 96. See also Barlow v. Marion County Hosp. Dist., 495 F. Supp. 682, 690-93 
(M.D. Fla. 1980) (exhaustion requirement not effected by alleging civil rights clnims). 
287. See Rosenblatt, Health Care Reform & Administrative Law: A Structural Ap-
proach, 88 YAI:E L.J. 243, 273-76 (1978) (citing Perry v. Greater S.E. Community Hosp. 
Found., No. 725-71 (D.D.C. June 28, 1972) (no relieO); Cook v. Ochsner Found. Hosp., 319 
F. Supp. 603, 606 (E.D. La. 1970) (granting relieO. See also Note, Preventing Patient 
Dumping: Sharpening the COBRA's Fangs, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1186, 1200 (1986) [hereinafter 
Note, Preventing Patient Dumping]. 
288. Gillis v. United States Dep't of Health and Human Servs., 759 F.2d 565, 578 (6th 
Cir. 1985). 
289. HHS has not provided facilities with formal technical assistance nor clear policies 
and procedures for implementing community service assurances. Its Office for Civil Rights 
has also been lax in review of violations. Dowell, supra note 272, at 487-88. 
290. Another potential enforcement tool is the tax law. Under both state and federol 
law, nonprofit hospitals are eligible for tax exemption. Legal advocates have been successful 
in a few instances in having the tax exempt status revoked for the hospital's failure to pro-
vide necessary hospital services to those unable to pay as a denial of a charitable purpose. 
Of course, such action does not provide the poor with a private cause of action, but the 
threat of change in tax status may work as an effective enforcement tool. See Dowell, supra 
note 272, at 489-90. See also Lugo v. Miller, 640 F.2d 823 (6th Cir. 1981) Oow income indi-
viduals brought class action challenging revenue ruling which states that hospitals are not 
compelled to provide free non-emergency care to maintain tax exempt status.) At least one 
attempt has been made to use the violation of Medicare regulations regarding emergency 
care conditions of participation to prove negligence in a private cause of action. See Distad 
v. Cubin, 633 P.2d 167 (Wyo. 1981). 
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V. THE CoBRA STATUTE: THE FEDERAL SoLUTION? 
The Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (CO-
BRA) of 1985, effective August 1, 1986, added a new section to the 
Medicare provisions, entitled "Examination and Treatment for 
Emergency Medical Conditions and Women in Labor."291 
The Ways and Means Committee of the House of Representa-
tives introduced the new provision because it was greatly con-
cerned about the increasing number of reports that hospital emer-
gency rooms were refusing to accept or treat patients with 
emergency conditions if the patient did not have medical insur-
ance. 292 The main concern of the Committee was that medically 
unstable patients were being treated inappropriately. There con-
tinued to be reports of cases in which treatment was simply not 
provided and of patients in an unstable condition who had been 
transferred improperly, sometimes without the consent of the re-
ceiving hospital. 293 
A. The Provisions 
COBRA applies to hospitals that participate in the Medicare 
program. This includes virtually all hospitals. However, hospitals 
without an emergency service, any facility that is not a hospital, 
free-standing emergency facilities that are not owned or formally 
affiliated with a hospital, and ambulatory care facilities and their 
staff physicians are all exempt from the federal law.294 The law 
protects all persons who come to an emergency room, whether or 
not such persons are eligible for Medicare benefits. 29G All persons 
who show up at the emergency door must be treated alike, whether 
291. The new statute is found at 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (1986). The emergency care pro· 
visions generally are referred to as "COBRA." Proposed rules were not issued until June 
1988. 53 Fed. Reg. 22,513 (proposed June 16, 1988) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 405, 489, 
1001, 1003). Refer to note 4 supra and accompanying text. 
292. H.R. REP. No. 241, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 21 (1985). Refusal to treat indi· 
gent patients has increased because fewer patients have adequate health insurance and most 
insurers, including Medicare and Medicaid, will not pay hospitals for the extra cost of cross· 
subsidizing cases of those unable to pay. With new competitive pressures to cut costs, there 
is even less economic incentive to subsidize emergency care than there was a decade ago. 
The growth of investor-owned for-profit hospitals, which generally discourage treatment of 
the nonpaying patient, has further exacerbated the problem. See Equal Access, supra note 
2, at 98-99, 105 (statement of Dr. Reiman). 
293. H.R. REP. No. 241, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 21 (1985). 
294. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a) (1986). 
295. Id. 
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or not they are insured. This duty is not conditioned on any guar-
antee of government reimbursement. 
The federal statute requires that the hospital examine each 
person who requests medical treatment to determine if an emer-
gency situation exists or if the individual is in active labor.:l9a If 
such person is in active labor or in need of emergency care, then 
the hospital must: (1) provide treatment to stabilize the emergency 
condition; (2) provide treatment for labor; or (3) provide for an 
"appropriate transfer" of the patient to another medical facility.:m 
An "appropriate transfer" is carefully defined under the stat-
ute. If the patient has not been stabilized, or is in active labor, the 
hospital may not transfer unless: (1) the patient or legally respon-
sible person acting on behalf of the patient requests a transfer;298 
or (2) a physician, or other qualified person when a physician is 
not readily available, signs a certification to the effect that the 
"medical benefits reasonably expected from the provision of appro-
priate medical treatment at another medical facility outweigh the 
increased risks to the individual's medical condition from effecting 
the transfer."299 A patient may be transferred only if: (1) the re-
ceiving hospital or facility has available space, qualified personnel 
for treatment of the patient, has agreed to the transfer and has 
been provided with the appropriate medical records from the 
transferring hospital;300 and (2) the transfer is made using proper 
296. I d. The statute defines an "emergency medical condition" as "a medical condition 
manifesting itself by acute symptoms of sufficient severity (including severe pain) such that 
the absence of immediate medical attention could reasonably be expected to result in -
(a) placing the patient's health in serious jeopardy, 
(b) serious impairment to bodily functions, or 
(c) serious dysfunction of any bodily organ or part." 
Id. § 1395dd(e)(l). 
"Active labor" is defined as "labor at a time at which -
(a) delivery is imminent, 
(b) there is inadequate time to effect safe transfer to another hospital prior to 
delivery or, 
(c) a transfer may pose a threat to the health and safety of the patient or the 
unborn child." 
Id. § 1395dd(e)(2). 
297. Id. § 1395dd(b). The statute also provides that the hospital has met its duty if 
medical treatment is refused by the patient, or if the patient refuses an "appropriate" trans-
fer. Id. 
298. Id. § 1395dd(c)(l). 
299. Id. For example; the patient is badly burned and the transfer hospital has a spe-
cial burn trauma unit. 
300. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(c)(2) (1986). 
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personnel and equipment;301 and (3) the transfer meets any other 
requirements which the Secretary of Health, Education and Wel-
fare may deem necessary.302 
Violations of the statute subject a hospital to suspension or 
termination of its Medicare provider agreement.303 In addition, 
both the hospital and the "responsible physician"304 may be 
charged a fifty-thousand-dollar civil penalty for each knowing vio-
lation of the statute. 3011 The penalty provisions were a matter of 
controversy. The original bill provided for the imposition of crimi-
nal penalties on a "responsible physician," allowing fines of up to 
100,000 dollars and imprisonment for up to one year, or both.300 
This provision was harshly criticized, 307 and the House Committee 
301. Id. This includes the use of necessary and appropriate life support measures. 
302. Id. 
303. Id. § 1395dd(d)(l). 
304. A "responsible physician" is defined as one who is employed by or under contract 
with the hospital and, within the scope of his/her employment or duties under the contract 
"has professional responsibility for the provision of examinations or treatments for the indi-
vidual, or transfers of the individual, with respect to which the violation occurred." Id. § 
1395dd(d)(2). The proposed rule further expands on this definition. 53 Fed. Reg. 22,513, 
22,525 (proposed June 16, 1988). 
305. !d. This amount was raised from $25,000 to $50,000 for violations occurring on or 
after December 22, 1987 pursuant to the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. 
L. No. 100-203, § 4009(a)(1), 101 Stat. 1330, 1330-57 (1987). Further technical amendments 
were made in the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-360, § 
411(b)(8), 102 Stat. 683, 771 (1988). 
306. H.R. REP. No. 241, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3, at 14 (1985). 
307. Paul M. Bunge, representing the Miami, Florida law firm of Kenny, Nachwalter 
& Seymour, wrote to the Judiciary Committee and charged that criminal sanctions were too 
harsh: 
The availability of insurance coverage for violations of [the proposed bill] is ques-
tionable. Most policies specifically exclude coverage for damages incurred as a re· 
suit of criminal acts, and insurance in such circumstances may otherwise be pro· 
hibited as a matter of public policy .... The Committee should also bear in mind 
that most States require the revocation of a medical license upon conviction of a 
felony related to the practice of medicine •... Thus the violation, purposeful or 
inadvertent, of [the bill] by a physician will almost always result in that physi· 
cian's removal from the profession .... I fear that [the proposed bill] is over· 
broad in its application, vague in its requirements and unnecessarily severe in its 
sanctions. 
Id. at 19-20. 
The American College of Emergency Physicians also wrote to the Judiciary Committee: 
Although we are in agreement with the objective of the legislation (i.e., to 
eliminate inappropriate patient transfers), we believe the statutory language is ex-
cessively punitive to emergency physicians without truly addressing the patient 
transfer problem. The language as approved by the Ways and Means Committee 
is so intimidating to emergency physicians that transfers which are in the best 
interest of patient care may be avoided or delayed. Because of the uncertain na· 
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on the Judiciary deleted it because it was "unnecessary, unwise, 
and raise[ d) serious Constitutional questions under the due process 
clause/'308 
The "civil enforcement" provision provides that any individ-
ual who suffers personal harm due to a hospital's violation of the 
statute may institute a civil action to obtain damages and equita-
ble relief.309 Any medical facility that suffers a direct financial loss 
due to a violation of the statute may also institute a private cause 
of action against the participating hospital for damages and equi-
table relief.310 There is a two-year statute of limitation for these 
actions. 311 
Such comprehensive enforcement provisions are unprece-
dented in a Medicare statute, yet the bill passed with little notice 
by the general public. No hearings on the proposed bill were held 
in the House or the Senate, 312 and two letters received by the 
House Judiciary Committee on the penalty provision appear to be 
the only public reaction received.313 
B . . Prospects and Problems 
COBRA answers many of the concerns of plaintiffs who have 
been trying to find a duty on the part of hospitals to provide emer-
gency medical treatment since O'Neill v. Montefiore Hospital.314 
ture of the practice of emergency medicine and because of the retrospective stan· 
dards of liability of this provision, emergency physicians may avoid transfers in 
order to protect themselves against criminal penalties and ultimate loss of their 
medical licenses because of the potential of felony convictions. Extreme caution 
could also result in prolonged detentions and unnecessary admissions. Neither is 
in the interest of patient care and both would increase health care costs. 
Id. at 21-22. 
308. ld. at 7. 
309. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(3)(A) (1986). The section specifically allows "damages 
available for personal injury under the law of the State in which the hospital is located." I d. 
For a discussion of this provision, refer to notes 343-70 infra and accompanying text. It is 
the position of one hospital attorney that the statute "is a litigation time bomb waiting to 
explode." Dooley, New Federal Law Helps Medical Malpractice Plaintiffs, 6 LAw. ALERT 
330 (1987). 
310. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(3)(B) (1986). 
311. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(3)(C) {1986). The federal statute also specifically states 
that its provisions do not preempt any state or local law requirement, except to the extent 
that there is a direct conflict between them and the requirements of the federal law. I d. § 
1395dd(f). Refer to notes 347-55 infra and accompanying text. 
312. H.R REP. No. 241, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3, at 6 (1985). 
313. Refer to note 307 supra. 
314. 11 A.D.2d 132, 202 N.Y.S.2d 436 (1960). Refer to notes 54-60 supra and accompa-
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Of course, the greatest achievement of the COBRA statute is the 
creation of a statutory duty to offer at least stabilizing treatment 
in an emergency. The requirement of a medical screening examina-
tion establishes the relationship between the hospital and the pa-
tient; therefore, there is no longer a need for courts to creatively 
interpret the facts of a case to find this relationship. 31G Also, there 
is no further need for courts to find theories on which to base lia-
bility such as those evidenced in Manlove316 and Guerrero.311 The 
statute provides that one need only prove a violation of the statute 
to establish a breach of the duty to examine or treat each individ-
ual who comes to the emergency department. 318 
The statute also addresses the concerns of the plaintiffs in Hill 
v. Ohio County319 and Campbell v. Mincey320 by placing "active 
labor" in the same status as an emergency condition and thereby 
requiring treatment.321 Furthermore, the plaintiff in Campbell 
should at least have been able to collect nominal damages. In fact, 
it appears that anyone who suffers "personal harm" as a result of a 
hospital's violation of the statute may collect damages. 322 There-
fore, relatives such as the mother of the child who died in 
Quijije323 might be able to recover for emotional distress. 
COBRA does not, however, answer all of the problems that 
typically face plaintiffs. Some problems may be rectified by final 
regulations, but others may require amendments. 324 First, it will be 
nying text. 
315. Id. 
316. 54 Del. 15, 174 A.2d 135 (1961). Refer to notes 62-105 supra and accompanying 
text. 
317. 112 Ariz. 104, 537 P.2d 1329 (1975). Refer to notes 214-28 supra and accompany· 
ing text. 
318. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d) (Supp. IV 1986). 
319. 468 S.W.2d 306 (Ky. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1041 (1972). Refer to notes 130· 
39 supra and accompanying text. 
320. 413 F. Supp. 16 (N.D. Miss. 1975), aff'd, 542 F.2d 573 (5th Cir. 1973). Refer to 
notes 233-45 supra and accompanying text. 
321. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a) (Supp. IV 1986). 
322. 42 U.S.C. 1395dd (d)(3)(A) (1986). 
323. 92 A.D.2d 935, 460 N.Y.S.2d 600 (1983). Refer to notes 267-70 supra and accom· 
panying text. 
324. It is beyond the scope and purpose of this Section to discuss all of the limitations 
of the federal statute given its focus on inappropriate transfer of patients. Therefore, tho 
analysis in this Section will emphasize the ways in which the statute does or does not doni 
with the problem of refusal to render emergency care, focusing particularly on the private 
cause of action as an effective enforcement tool. For an excellent analysis of the statute ns to 
its effect on interhospital transfers, see Preventing Patient Dumping, supra note 287, nt 
1204-09. 
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difficult to prove a violation. Vague definitions control whether a 
person comes within the protection of the statute. For example, an 
"appropriate medical screening exam" is not defined, nor is there 
any indication as to who may or must conduct this exam.3211 The 
definitions of "emergency" and "active labor"326 are also not spe-
cific enough to clearly indicate when the statute applies.327 There-
fore, courts may still be left with much latitude to decide what is 
or is not an "emergency" or "active" labor. Perhaps Hill v. Ohio 
County328 would not have been decided so very differently under 
COBRA.329 The American College of Emergency Physicians 
(ACEP) has suggested the use of a more extensive definition of 
"emergency medical condition."330 A more detailed definition of 
"active labor" exists in the Hill-Burton policy manual and it 
should be used as a model from which to draft COBRA regula-
tions.331 As noted above, these definitions are the key to whether 
patients come within the protection of the statute, and should be 
as detailed and easy to interpret as possible. 
325. Nurses generally conduct this exam or "triage," and the regulations should make 
clear whether this practice may continue. There is no description of what elements this 
examination must include. See Preventing Patient Dumping, supra note 287, at 1216; See 
also Kellermann & Hackman, Emergency Department Patient "Dumping" in Memphis, 
Tennessee: An Analysis of Interhospital Transfers to the Regional Medical Center at 
Memphis, reprinted in Equal Access, supra note 2, at 122, 125 (recommending that "appro-
priate screening exam" be defined and judged against a national standard of care). 
326. Refer to note 296 supra. . 
327. See Equal Access, supra note 2, at 154 (statement of David Ansell,l\LD., Attend-
ing Physician, Division of General Medicine/Prinlary Care, Cook County Hospital, Chicago, 
lllinois); Preventing Patient Dumping, supra note 287, at 1209, 1212. 
328. 468 S.W.2d 306 (Ky. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1041 (1972). 
329. Refer to notes 130-39 supra and accompanying text. 
330. For the ACEP definition of an "emergency," see ACEP Board Reviews Dejini· 
tions of Bona Fide Emergencies, ACEP NEWS, Dec. 1982, at 1, coL 1. See also Preuenting 
Patient Dumping, supra note 287, at 1210-11 (recommending HHS adoption of previous, 
broader ACEP definition); Ansell & Schiff, Patient Dumping: Status, Implications, and 
Policy Recommendations, 257 J. A.M.A. 1500, 1502, reprinted in Equal Access, supra note 
2, at 175, 177 (recommending use of ACEP definitions of "emergency"). 
331. The definition of "active labor" used by the Health and Human Services Office 
for Civil Rights is: 
A woman giving birth for the first tinle should be admitted when her contrac-
tions are regular, progressively hard and closer and occurring at about five minute 
intervals. A woman who has given birth before should be admitted as soon as her 
contractions are regular and the diagnosis of labor seems likely. The overnll prin-
ciple guiding these rules is that admission to the hospital should, if possible, be 
delayed until labor is established but not so long that there is a risk of delivery 
outside the hospital. 
Advocate's Guide, supra note 277, at 41 (quoting OCR Community Service Guide, at Tab 
B). See Preventing Patient Dumping, supra note 287, at 1212. 
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The statute also suffers from problems of scope. In other 
words, there are a number of ways in which hospitals and physi-
cians can evade the purposes of the statute, without actually vio-
lating it. For example, the law does not explicitly provide for a 
penalty for on-call physicians who refuse to respond in an emer-
gency. Smaller hospitals may not have an emergency physician on 
the premises at all times, and many hospitals use the services of 
on-call specialists in the emergency room.332 The statute and the 
proposed regulations define "responsible physician"333 in a manner 
that may be broad enough to include the on-call physician. How-
ever, the final regulations or an amendment to the statute should 
clarify this point. The on-call physician's refusal to treat is a grow-
ing problem.334 
Another potential loophole in the statute involves "pre-dump-
ing," that is, advance agreements with ambulance services di-
recting indigent persons to public hospitals and away from private 
hospitals.335 This problem is not covered in the statute as it now 
reads, yet could become a widely used method by which to avoid 
its goals. Therefore, the federal statute should be amended to pro-
hibit such agreements. 
A third problem of scope is known as "reverse dumping," in 
which the transferee hospital refuses to accept the patient because 
332. See Hastings v. Baton Rouge Gen. Hosp., 498 So. 2d 713, 715-16 (La. 1986) (the 
thoracic surgeon on-call inquired as to whether the victim of a stabbing had insurance and, 
upon receiving a negative reply, refused to come to the hospital and ordered that the patient 
be transferred). 
A similar incident took place in a rural Idaho hospital which used an on-call emergency 
physician. A child, suffering from severe stomach pains and a high fever, was brought into 
the emergency room by her parents. The doctor, after determining that the family had no 
insurance, stated that he could not come in for several hours. The child was eventually 
treated and recovered, but was subjected to hours of pain, distress, and anxiety. Equal Ac· 
cess, supra note 2, at 45 (statement of Judith Waxman, Attorney, National Health Law 
Program). 
333. Refer to note 304 supra. 
334. Equal Access, supra note 2, at 39, 52 (statement of Judith Waxman, Attorney, 
National Health Law Program); id. at 261-62 (statement of Lois Salisbury, attorney repre· 
senting Coalition to Stop Patient Dumping). Hospitals may also address the problem by 
tying on-call duties to hospital staff privileges. A hospital's failure to do so might result in 
loss of licensure. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CoDE § 1317.3(c) (West Supp. 1988). 
335. Equal Access, supra note 2, at 241 (statement of Richard P. Kusserow, Inspector 
General, Office for Civil Rights); id. at 260 (statement of Salisbury). See also Wideman v. 
Shallowford Community Hosp., No. 86-8512 (11th Cir., Sept. 8, 1987) (woman in labor re-
peatedly asked to be taken to a specific hospital, but was taken, in accordance with the 
ambulance service's agreement with the county, to a public hospital) (discussed in 11th Cir· 
cuit Finds No Constitutional Right to Medical Treatment, 10 HEALTH L. VIGIL 1 (1987)). 
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the patient has no insurance or because of some other, nonmedical 
reason. For example, a large, rural, tertiary hospital in McAllen, 
Texas, implemented a policy in which it would not accept transfers 
of Medicaid patients or patients without insurance. As a result, a 
smaller hospital in the area was denied permission to transfer a 
teenager with a gunshot wound who was in need of tertiary care. 
Thus, it advised the boy's parents to simply "show up" at the 
emergency room of the tertiary hospital where it would have to 
treat him. The hospital did not violate the "letter" of the law, but 
it certainly violated its "spirit. "336 COBRA should be amended to 
include within its scope a prohibition against "reverse 
dumping."337 
Perhaps the greatest problems with the COBRA statute lie in 
its enforcement provisions. Although federal officials claim that the 
law can be implemented without regulations, 338 the facts do not 
bear this out. As noted earlier, proposed rules were not issued until 
June 1988.339 As of September 30, 1988, only 224 investigations 
had been filed with HHS.340 At a Congressional hearing held on 
July 22, 1987, physicians testified that the statute had "no percep-
tible impact" on their hospitals.341 One reason for the ineffective-
ness of the COBRA statute may be a lack of public information. In 
fact, most filed complaints originated in Texas and California, the 
states with strict emergency care statutes and much media atten-
tion to persistent refusals by hospitals to treat emergency 
patients.342 
336. The boy died a few days later. Equal Access, supra note 2, at 44-45 (statement of 
Judith Waxman, Attorney, National Health Law Program). 
337. See Preventing Patient Dumping, supra note 287, at 1221; see also H.R. REP. No. 
531, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1988). 
338. Equal Access, supra note 2, at 202 (statement of William Roper, M.D., Adminis-
trator, HCFA). 
339. Refer to note 291 supra and accompanying text. 
340. Of the 224 investigations authorized, 212 have been completed and 12 are pend-
ing. Of those hospitals investigated, 146 were found in compliance, 61 out of compliance and 
5 are still under review. Two hospitals have had their provider agreements terminated: York 
Plaza Hospital, Houston, Texas and Mary E. Dickerson Hospital, Jasper, Texas. Telephone 
discussion on Nov. 2, 1988 with Spencer Colburn, Chief, Acute Care Services Branch, Office 
of Survey & Certification, Health Standards & Quality Bureau, Health Care Financing Ad-
min., HHS, Baltimore, Md. 
341. Id. at 13-14; Equal Access, supra note 2, at 181-82 (statements of Drs. Ansell & 
Kellermann). 
342. H.R. REP. No. 531, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1988); Equal Access, supra note 2, at 
app. at 434-39. To achieve compliance nationally, a greater effort must be made to inform 
the public as to the new law's existence. This can be done, in part, through the media and 
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Potentially, the most powerful enforcement tool is the threat 
of civil enforcement. This enforcement provision provides, in part, 
that 
any individual who suffers personal harm as a direct result of a 
participating hospital's violation of a requirement of this section 
may, in a civil action against the participating hospital, obtain 
those damages available for personal injury under the law of the 
State in which the hospital is located, and such equitable relief as 
is appropriate. 3' 3 
should include the posting of notices in emergency rooms. Making pamphlets or some other 
form of written notice available to emergency room patients would increase knowledge of 
the statute and would be a major first step in the direction of enforcement. See Equal Ac· 
cess, supra note 2, at 52 (statement of Judith Waxman, Attorney, National Health Law 
Program). H.R. REP. No. 531, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 17, 21 (1988); Preventing Patient Dump• 
ing, supra note 287, at 1220. 
The next step would be regulations which clarify the proper procedure to file com· 
plaints. Included in these regulations would be procedures by which the proper HHS agency 
would respond to the complainants. Numerous problems exist in ensuring that those who 
file complaints receive notice of receipt of the complaint and notice of the final outcome of 
the investigation. Equal Access, supra note 2, at 229 (statement of Rep. Ted Weiss, New 
York). 
Several other enforcement issues should be addressed by the final regulations or by 
amendment. First, when is an investigation warranted, and what guidelines should be used 
in the investigation? Equal Access, supra note 2, at 239-40. Second, a method of monitoring 
should be instituted, involving written records of all transfers or discharges of emergency 
room patients, and review of such records by JCAHO or by an agency of HHS should be 
done on a regular basis. See Equal Access, supra note 2, at 65 (statement of Judith Wax-
man); id. at 159 (statement of Dr. Ansell). See also H.R. REP. No. 531, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 
15, 19 (1988)(recommendation of Dr. Arthur L. Kellerman, medical director of emergency 
medical services, The Regional Medical Center, Memphis, Tenn., that hospitals receiving 
transferred patients file reports of all dumping cases which could be periodically audited by 
an agency such as JCAHO); Preventing Patient Dumping, supra note 287, at 1219 (recom-
mending prompt investigation by HHS personnel). Third, because of reluctance of hospitals, 
who are often in the same community or hospital association, to report violations the law 
should require hospitals to report incidents of patient dumping. Equal Access, supra note 2, 
at 39, 53 (statement of Judith Waxman). The proposed regulations do provide this provi-
sion. 53 Fed. Reg. at 22,523 (1988) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 489.24) (proposed June 
16, 1988). 
343. 42 U.S.C. 1395dd(d)(3)(A) (Supp. IV 1986). The House originally provided 
broader language: "Any person who suffers personal harm ... may bring a civil action, in 
an appropriate Federal district court against the participating hospital, for damages and 
other appropriate relief." See CoNFERENCE CoMMI'ITEE REPORT ON THE CoNSOLIDATED OMNI· 
BUS BUDGET RECONCILIATION ACT OF 1985 (H.R. 3128), reprinted in Medicare & Medicaid 
Guide (CCH) Special 4, No. 481, at 476. (Jan. 13, 1986). 
The Senate bill made no provision for a private right of action. The conference agree-
ment modified the House language with the following explanation: 
The civil enforcement provision was restructured to clarify its application. In 
addition, the courts are directed, on the issue of damages, to apply the law of the 
State in which the violating hospital is located, for actions brought by a harmed 
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If this provision is to have an impact, it must be clarified and 
strengthened.34' To date, only a handful of cases have been filed by 
individuals harmed by a hospital's violation of the statute.3411 
The first problem plaintiffs face is one of causation, proving 
that harm was directly caused by a hospital's violation. Most peo-
ple who enter an emergency room are by definition sick or injured. 
If their conditions deteriorate or they die it may not be possible to 
prove that harm was the direct result of the denial of care or pa-
tient transfer.346 
Another problem with this provision is the language that pro-
vides the individual with damages available for personal injury 
under state law. Does this provision bring us full circle, back to the 
old common law? Is this language meant to limit the amount of 
damages based on each state's personal injury law or exclude dam-
ages altogether under certain circumstances? For example, would 
plaintiffs in some states be prevented from receiving punitive dam-
ages for a hospital's violation? 
The COBRA statute does provide that it will not "preempt 
.any state or local law requirement, except to the extent that the 
requirement directly conflicts with a requirement of this sec-
tion."3'7 At a minimum, this provision appears to address require-
ments pursuant to state or local emergency care statutes.348 Under 
I d. 
individual or a hospital which suffers a financial loss. The language allowing courts 
to grant 'other appropriate relier was also modified to read 'other equitable relief 
as appropriate,' to give the courts clearer direction that such relief should be 
within the courts [sic] regular equitable powers and should be granted for the 
purpose of remedying the violation or deterring subsequent violntions. 
344. H.R REP. No. 531, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 14-19 {1988). 
345. The National Law Journal, June 6, 1988 at 1, col 1, 29, col 4. It hns been re-
ported that only one civil damage law suit has been filed in Chicago and six cases are on file 
in Boston alleging COBRA violations. One expert predicts the "full impact of the law will 
not be felt until several cases go through the appeal process." Id. at 30, col 4. 
346. Consider for example, the case of Terry Takewell, who was diabetic and very ill 
when he was denied treatment in the emergency room. Refer to note 2 supra and accompa· 
nying text. Since necessary tests were never done, it might be extremely difficult to prove 
that the hospital's violation directly caused his death. Furthermore, because he died, his 
direct testimony of what happened will not be available. See Equal Access, supra note 2, at 
298, 300 (letter from Gordon Bonnyman, Staff Attorney, Legal Services of Middle 
Tennessee). 
347. 42 U.S.C. 1395dd(O (Supp. IV 1986) {emphasis supplied). 
348. State or local laws that set looser standards and directly conllict v.ith COBRA 
should be preempted. Based on the intent of Congress it would be fair to argue that stricter 
state standards should be maintained, unless there is clearly strong evidence of a direct 
conflict with federal law. See, e.g., Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Laboratories, 
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the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution,3" 9 however, federal pre-
emption will also be implied if a state law frustrates the intent and 
purpose of the federal statute. 3110 Although health and safety mat-
ters are traditionally local concerns, Congress expressed its intent 
to seek a national solution to assuring access to emergency care. aGt 
On the other hand, the civil enforcement provision specifically re-
lies on state law for obtaining damages and equitable relief. 
How then does the federal right of action apply to state law? 
Would charitable immunity, sovereign immunity, or "good samari-
tan" immunity laws apply? 3112 Would "caps"3113 on damages and 
other tort reforms limit the amounts available under the statute or 
be preempted in favor of a uniform federal law for these cases?304 
Without a legislative history, one can only speculate whether Con-
gress would have intended to do away with "caps" and other tort 
reform measures implemented by the states to achieve goals such 
as lowering medical malpractice insurance rates or encouraging 
physicians to continue practicing their profession. The answer may 
depend on whether such reforms apply equally to all plaintiffs for 
personal injury. 
The COBRA statute should preempt certain immunities. If 
this were not so, then states could enact statutes which revive cer-
tain immunities and avoid the new statute's requirements alto-
gether. In fact, this is a very real threat in light of recent state 
legislation which attempts to apply good samaritan laws to hospi-
tal emergency rooms. 31111 
471 U.S. 707 (1985)(holding county regulations governing blood plasma centers not pre· 
empted by Food and Drug Administration regulations establishing minimum standards). 
349. U.S. CoNST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
350. See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 211 (1824); Hines v. Davida· 
witz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). 
351. Refer to note 348 supra. 
352. One hospital attorney argues that COBRA appears to preempt all state law. See 
Dooley, New Federal Law Helps Medical Malpractice Plaintiffs, 6 LAw. ALERT 330, 332 
(June 15, 1987). 
353. If caps are just limited to "medical malpractice" awards, one might argue that 
this does not apply to awards for "personal injury," the term used in the COBRA provision. 
If the cap covers all personal injury, however, it might limit the award under this COBRA 
provision. Discussion with Stephen Frew and Robert Dooley,legal consultants on emergency 
care (July 15, 1988). 
354. Refer to note 352 supra. 
355. All states and the District of Columbia have adopted good samaritan laws. Such 
laws protect health care professionals and others who render emergency assistance from civil 
liability for damages for any injury they cause or enhance. These statutes range from mere 
codifications of the common law to grants of absolute immunity. The first statute was 
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Few cases have interpreted the use of good samaritan laws. 
The first attempt to utilize such protection in a refusal to treat 
case was Guerrero. 3156 Since then, these laws have been utilized as 
defenses when negligent treatment was rendered in the hospital.3157 
As early as the 1960s, commentators were shocked at the pros-
pect that these immunity statutes might be applied to emergency 
rooms.3158 Yet other commentators have urged more uniform inclu-
passed in 1959 in California. See generally Note, Good Samaritans and Hospital Emergen-
cies, 54 S. CAL. L. REv. 417 {1981) [hereinafter Good Samaritans). 
The intent of good samaritan laws is to encourage physicians and others to respond to 
emergencies {typically at the scene of an accident) when they have no legal duty to do so. 
The hope is that emergency care would then be provided to those who would otherwise not 
receive it. Since there would be no threat of suit, health care professionals would be more 
willing to provide assistance. Throughout the 1960s this legislation spread, in spite of a 1963 
American Medical Association study which found that the laws ronde no significant differ-
ence in a physician's behavior. First Results: 1963 Professional Liability Survey, 189 J. 
A.M.A. 859, 865 {1964). In the study, 51.5% of the physicians in states which had enacted 
good samaritan law said they would stop to furnish aid, and 47.7% of physicians in states 
that did not have good samaritan statutes said they would do so. Id. 
Nevertheless, by the time of the malpractice insurance "crisis" of 1974, state legislatures 
were anxious to respond, and expansion of the good samaritan statutes wns a popular solu-
tion. B. FURROW, S. JoHNSON, L JoST & R ScHWARTZ, HEALTH LAw: CASES MATERJALS AND 
PROBLEMS 134-35 n.2 {West 1987). At that time no cases had been found in which a physi-
cian had been sued for malpractice for rendering emergency care outside of a medical office 
or hospital See 2 LOUISELL & WILLIAMS, l\1EDICAL MALPRACTICE 11 21.01, at 21-3, 21-4 {1988). 
Rather, most reported cases involved attempts by physicians to invoke good samaritan pro-
tection for negligence within the hospitaL I d. at 21-4. This occurred although the majority 
of state statutes continued to exclude medical services rendered in the hospital from good 
samaritan immunity. Most jurisdictions require that the care be given nt the scene of the 
emergency, which may be defined to specifically exclude the hospital or the presence of 
medical equipment. Although less clear, the language of other statutes implies that the hos-
pital setting is excluded. See Good Samaritans, supra note 355, at 428; See also Note, Good 
Samaritan Statutes: Time for Uniformity, 27 WAYNE L. REv. 217, 228 {1980). A few juris-
dictions, such as Alaska, Kansas, Texas, and Michigan do expressly include emergencies 
within a hospital ALAsKA STAT. § 09.65.90 {1983); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-289{c) {1985 & 
Supp. 1987); TEx. CIV. PRAc. & Rl!:l'ot Con& ANN.§ 17.001 {Vernon 1986); 1\ficiL CoMP. LAws 
ANN.§ 691.1502 {West 1987). Texas, however, does not provide immunity to a person who 
"regularly administers care in the emergency room, • • • an admitting physician, • • . or a 
treating physician associated by the admitting physician." TEx. C1v. PRAc. & REM. Con& § 
17.001 {Vernon 1986). 
356. 112 Ariz. 104, 537 P.2d 1329 {1975). Refer to text accompanying note 228 supra. 
357. See, e.g., Colby v. Schwartz, 78 Cal. App. 3d 885, 888, 144 Cal Rptr. 624, 625 
{1978) {physicians acting in normal course of practice not immune); McKenna v. Cedars of 
Lebanon Hosp., 93 Cal. App. 3d 282, 286, 155 Cal. Rptr. 631, 633 {1979) (resident not "on 
call" for emergencies protected by statute); Gragg v. Neurological Assocs., 152 Ga. App. SSS, 
263 S.E.2d 496,497-98 {1979) {crisis during hospital procedure not emergency within protec-
tion of statute). 
358. See, e.g., Comment, Good Samaritans and Liability for Medical Malpractice, 64 
CoLUr.t L. REv. 1301, 1310 {1964); Note, Good Samaritan Legislation: An Analysis and a 
Proposal, 38 TEMP. L.Q. 418, 425 {1965); Good Samaritans, supra note 355, at 430. 
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sion of the hospital emergency room and its personnel within the 
protection of such statutes. 359 This protective approach is seen as a 
means of assuring that emergency care is provided without the fear 
of liability. This position has political appeal, particularly as state 
legislatures attempt to respond to the most recent boycotts of 
emergency rooms by physicians protesting rising malpractice rates. 
Now that both hospitals and physicians have affirmative du-
ties under COBRA to provide treatment to those in need of emer-
gency care, will such good samaritan statutes frustrate the intent 
and purpose of the federal statute? In theory, good samaritan stat-
utes should not apply where an affirmative duty has already been 
established. In practice, there will be confusion over the federal 
statute and how it applies to these recent expansions in immunity. 
Two recent state legislative initiatives are illustrative. 
During the 1987 legislative session, Virginia was faced with a 
"crisis." Obstetricians were threatening to reduce their "on call" 
services to emergency rooms, particularly for poor women in active 
labor. Responding to increases in malpractice insurance rates, the 
physicians argued that emergency room practice increased their 
exposure to suit. Pregnant women, either on Medicaid or without 
any health insurance, would show up at the emergency door in ac-
tive labor, without a regular physician and with no medical 
records. The physicians characterized their role in treating these 
women as "good samaritans." Although physicians would not be 
required under state law to treat, the new law provides that, in the 
absence of gross negligence, "any person" would be granted immu-
nity from civil damages for acts or omissions resulting from the 
rendering of emergency obstetrical care.360 Under COBRA, would 
participating hospitals still be liable, even though the responsible 
physician was immune from suit? 
359. See, e.g., Tuttle, Hospital Emergency Rooms-Application of Good Samaritan 
Laws, 31 MEn. TRIAL TEcH. Q. 145 (1984). 
360. Senate Bill 408 passed March 23, 1987, amending § 8.01-225 of the Code of 
Virginia: 
Any person who, in the absence of gross negligence, renders emergency ob-
stetrical care or assistance to a female in active labor who has not previously been 
cared for in connection with the pregnancy by such person or by another profes-
sionally associated with such person and whose medical records are not reasonably 
available to such person shall not be liable for any civil damages for acts or omis-
sions resulting from the rendering of such emergency care or assistance. Tho im-
munity herein granted shall apply only to the emergency medical care provided. 
Discussion and background materials (unpublished) provided by Josephine Foehrenbach, 
Harvard Fellow, Va. Poverty Law Center, Inc., Richmond, Va. (1987). 
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In Georgia, similar efforts were successful to immunize health 
care providers and hospitals, among others, from liability for dam-
ages for injury or death resulting from an act or omission in ren-
dering professional services when the services provided "volunta-
rily and without the expectation or receipt of compensation"}101 
Once again, the legislation was framed as a "good samaritan" bill 
to encourage the provision of services without threat of suit. 302 
Although these statutes may make political sense, they should 
be discouraged in the context of providing emergency room care. 
Physicians and hospitals have an affirmative duty under COBRA 
to examine and treat all emergency patients and those women in 
active labor regardless of ability to pay. The law was passed to as-
sure access without undermining the standards applicable to their 
care. To allow this immunity will result in a continued two-tiered 
system for emergency care. Clearly, this result is contrary to the 
legislative purpose of the new federal statute, which was to pro-
mote access and quality of service regardless of income. There is 
no credible evidence that such immunity will in fact reduce insur-
ance rates or increase access to care. Any attempt through the use 
of an immunity statute to compromise such a goal should be pre-
361. Emphasis added. § 51-1-29.1 of Georgia Code provides: 
(a) [U]nless it is established that injuries or death were caused by gross negli-
gence or willful or wanton misconduct: 
(1) No health care provider .•• who voluntarily and without the expectation 
or receipt of compensation provides professional services, within the scope of such 
health care provider's licensure, for and at the request of a hospital, public school, 
nonprofit organization, or an agency of the state or one of its political subdivisions 
or provides such professional services to a person at the request of such organiza-
tion, which organization does not expect or receive compensation with respect to 
such services from the recipient of such services; or 
(2) No licensed hospital, public school, or nonprofit organization, which re-
quests, sponsors, or participates in the providing of the services under the circum-
stances provided in paragraph (1) of this subsection shall be liable for d!lDl!lges or 
injuries alleged to have been sustained by the person nor for d!lDl!lges for the in-
jury or death of the person when the injuries or death are alleged to have occurred 
by reason of an act or omission in the rendering of such services. 
(b) This Code section shall apply only to causes of action arising on or after 
July 1, 1987. 
GA. ConE ANN. § 51-1-29.1 (Supp. 1988). A number of more general immunity statutes have 
passed nationwide to immunize "volunteers" who provide medical services, regardless of the 
setting of such services. See, e.g., NATIONAL CoNFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, 1987 SuM-
MARY LIABILITY INSURANCE: :MAY 31, 1987, (1987). 
362. Discussion with Linda Lowe, Staff Member, Georgia Legal Services Program, At-
lanta, Ga. (Spring 1987). 
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empted by federal statute. 363 If not, the statute must be specifically 
amended to prohibit immunity under state law for violations of the 
COBRA statute. 
In fact, research shows no correlation between low income and 
a proclivity to file suits against physicians and hospitals. 364 The 
poor do not tend to file suits. Personal injury cases are expensive 
and lawyers are reluctant to take such cases on a contingency basis 
from poor people without an assurance of substantial dollar 
worth.365 Ironically, the failure of the poor to sue may limit the 
ultimate impact of civil enforcement. 
Of course, the "preventive effect of the statute is diluted if 
only those cases which command a large damage award are 
brought."366 It has been proposed that the award of attorney's fees 
would correct this problem.387 Similar fee-shifting provisions al-
ready exist in antitrust, consumer protection, and tax appeal stat-
utes. These statutes recognize the importance of attracting compe-
tent counsel and the belief that it is only fair for the wrongdoer to 
pay the cost of vindicating federal rights. 368 
Another approach suggested to strengthen civil enforcement is 
to provide for liquidated damages to be paid to the individual 
363. Refer to notes 348-54 supra and accompanying text. 
364. See, e.g., DANZON, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 75 (1985). Danzon states that the per-
centage of the population on welfare, the unemployment rate and the per capita income had 
no significant effect on claim frequency or severity of claims filed. I d. See also Rudov, Myers 
& Mirabella, Medical Malpractice Insurance Claims Files Closed in 1970 (Appendix), in 
REPORT OF THE SECRETARY'S COMMISSION ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, (DHEW No. (OS) 73.89, 
1, 11-12 (1973). 
365. See Rosenblatt, Rationing "Normal" Health Care: The Hidden Legal Issues, 59 
TExAs L. REv. 1401, 1415-16 (1981) for an excellent summary of why traditional malpractice 
law does not serve the interests of protecting the poor. Rosenblatt notes that the poor have 
low expectations regarding treatment and results; little incentive to seek recovery because 
they must return part of the award to the welfare department; and difficulty obtaining nc· 
cess to legal services. Nor can legal service attorneys accept such "fee-generating" cases 
from poor clients. Id. at 1415 n.87, citing 42 U.S.C. § 2996f(b)(1) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). 
366. H.R. REP. No. 100-531, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1988). 
367. Id. See also Equal Access, supra note 2, at 55, 262-63, 302. The following Inn· 
guage was suggested: "In any action or proceeding charging a violation of section 1867 of the 
Social Security Act [the COBRA antidumping amendment], the court in its discretion may 
allow the individual or hospital harmed by the violation reasonable attorney's fees as part of 
the costs." Id. at 55 (letter of Judith Waxman). See also CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CooE § 
1317.6(0 (West Supp. 1988)(providing for the award of reasonable attorney's fees). 
368. Equal Access, supra note 2, at 55, 57-58 (statement of Judith Waxman); id. at 
261-62 (statement of Lois Salisbury, Attorney, Coalition to Stop Patient Dumping); id. at 
299 (letter of Gordon Bonnyman, Staff Attorney, Legal Services of Middle Tennessee); H.R. 
REP. No. 531, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 19, 22 (1988). 
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harmed by the hospital's violation.369 Under common law, lost 
wages are an important measure of compensatory damages. Yet, 
the poor are often disabled or unemployed and thus, there is little 
expectation of any compensatory damages for economic loss. It is 
often not worth the expense of suing the hospital. Thus, even when 
an injury is not serious and an award of substantial compensatory 
damages is not likely, the hospital will at least be forced to pay a 
minimum amount of monetary damages to the victim. A liquidated 
damages provision would strengthen the rights of the poor to util-
ize the threat of a private cause of action as an effective enforce-
ment tool. 370 
CoNCLUSION 
An understanding of the evolution of the legal duty to provide 
emergency care should put the current state of the law in a more 
meaningful context. It should also alert us to the problems that 
still remain. 
Traditional tort law did not provide the basis for establishing 
a duty to treat those in need of emergency care and in active labor. 
The no-duty rule, immunity, and misinterpretation of the scant 
case law slowed any progress toward the search for a duty. It was 
not until the 1960s that the Manlove reliance theory offered a po-
tential source for expansion of liability. Neither the Afanlove reli-
ance theory nor the approach of the Guerrero court, which found 
the source of the duty in state licensing laws, provided a satisfac-
tory solution. With few exceptions, state law has also been limited 
in its approach to the problem, although Texas and California have 
provided leadership. These state approaches do not provide for a 
nationwide solution. Use of the federal Hill-Burton law has also 
been ineffective in enforcing a duty to provide emergency care. 
The COBRA statute does provide a source for the duty to pro-
vide emergency care. At a minimum, every individual who enters 
an emergency room must be examined without regard to ability to 
pay. The hospital-patient relationship has been established by law. 
Nevertheless, problems of definition and scope may impact on en-
forcement. How effective will civil enforcement be? The answer de-
369. Equal Access, supra note 2, at 301-02 (Letter of Bonnyman). Such a provision 
exists in the federal Truth in Lending Act. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (1982). 
370. Liquidated damages might be set at $50,000, to match the civil penalty provision. 
Refer to notes 304-05 supra and accompanying text. 
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pends on the barriers the injured plaintiff will face when bringing a 
private cause of action to obtain damages or appropriate equitable 
relief under state law. Conflicts will arise between this new federal 
cause of action and state law. Without strict judicial action, CO-
BRA may follow in the footsteps of past attempts to find the solu-
tion to a problem that will not go away. 
In any case, the law does have limits. The economic market-
place dictates many of the choices, and society has to continue to 
address the problem of access to health care for all, regardless of 
ability to pay. In the end, it is the duty of the health care institu-
tions, the providers, and our society to ensure that all persons, rich 
or poor, obtain medical care-at least when they are most vulnera-
ble: at the entrance to the emergency room. 
